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The aim of this study was to establish the long-run relationship between six selected South 
African indices (i.e., large cap, small cap, resources, value, growth and industrials). Long-run 
relationships were analyzed in relation to mutual funds’ style drift in an attempt to view the 
underlying diversification opportunities and potential risk faced by investors. The Engle-
Granger two-step procedure and asset class factor models were used to encounter this 
territory. Using daily and weekly closing prices from 2006 to 2014 the results from the 
Engle-Granger two-step procedure show that there are drastic changes in long-run 
relationships between the six selected indices when broken into two year periods. In addition, 
the results reveal that a vast number of long-run relationships were established during the 
2007 global financial crisis which indicates low diversification strategies during that period. 
The study captured a consistent, growing long-run relationship between three pairs of indices 
when the roll-over strategy was implemented. These pairs are small caps/ industrials, small 
caps/ large caps and small caps /value. 
The results from the asset class factor model show that there were two apparent style drifts 
and abundant stock picking in the period covered. However, the reported stock picking does 
not harm diversification properties since managers ensure that their moves are against 
binding long-run relationships. Furthermore, the results from the asset class factor model 
reveal that fund managers tend to follow one another’s moves. This is solid proof and 
confirmation of herding behaviour among fund managers. South African growth and value 
indices show complementary relationships when the literature pronounces them as 
substitutes. The literature declares them to be the opposite of each other. This study found 
that the growth and value indices possess strong positive linear relationships which are in 
contrast to what is documented in the literature.  
Changes in long-run relationships and dispersed asset allocations have direct implications for 
investors’ opportunities for diversification. Since positive long-run relationships erode 
diversifying properties, it is important to continue checking the long-run relationships 
between indices before investing as they are prone to drastic change in a short period of time, 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
  1.1 Introduction  
 
Unit trusts or mutual funds, as they are commonly referred to, have witnessed phenomenal 
growth over the past three decades primarily driven by surplus liquidity in most world 
economies.  Individual and institutional investors have favoured mutual funds as they offer 
diversification benefits even when small amounts are invested and, hence, offer a better 
opportunity to grow investment returns than could be achieved at household level. 
Furthermore, the amount of starting capital and technology required for unit trusts are not as 
demanding as for other investments or many other businesses (Njeri, 2012). Mutual funds 
consequently use these less restrictive requirements and returns as a carrot to lure investors 
and, in doing so, invest in ‘styles’ premised on the fund’s investment philosophy. The unit 
trust industry is regulated and is hence regarded as a safe investment vehicle. 
The question that arises is whether these mutual funds maintain their investment promise to 
deliver superior returns through consistently holding stocks that fit with the fund’s investment 
style or if they stray into other styles over time – a phenomenon referred to as style drifting. 
Mutual funds can be simply described as a collection of securities, monies, stocks and bonds 
from the public and private sectors with the aim of creating a large pool of wealth. Scholars 
like  Pástor and Stambaugh (2002) and Chen et al. (2013) define mutual funds as investment 
vehicles created with the purpose of pooling funds from different investors to invest in 
different asset classes. These funds, which are managed by highly qualified individuals, are 
known to have proper and skilled management. When individuals or corporations put money 
into mutual funds, these funds are combined with other funds from similar minded investors. 
This large pool of funds enables fund managers to adopt better investment strategies than 
could be achieved if everyone was investing their funds directly in the assets of their choice 
(Chen et al., 2013). This phenomenon is known as economies of scale. 
According to Rouwenhorst (2004), mutual funds can be traced back to the second half of the 
eighteenth century in The Netherlands. The first fund was motivated by the need to provide a 
small group of investors with the means and opportunities of diversifying their investments. 
This was achieved by investing in other countries like South America, Australia Germany 
and Spain, to name but a few. The first mutual fund emerged in a well-developed capital 
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market, the Amsterdam Exchange (Rouwenhorst, 2004). The number of mutual funds 
gradually increased in the eighteenth century when merchants and brokers learned how to 
broaden their investment opportunities. Mutual funds can be categorised in many different 
classes ranging from equity, to money market, bonds, mixed or absolute all-class. 
Equity funds are a common form of mutual funds that contain common and preferred stock 
securities (Cornett and Saunders, 2008). Money market mutual funds (MMMFs) are defined 
as low volatility types of investments that invest in cash assets and debt securities with short 
term maturities and minimal credit risk (Agapova, 2010). Open-end mutual funds are funds 
that do not place a limit on the amount of shares that the fund can issue and have no maturity 
period. The supply of shares in the fund is not fixed but can increase or decrease daily with 
purchase and redemption of shares (Cornett and Saunders, 2008). As long as there is demand 
for the fund’s shares, the fund manager will sell the shares to investors who require them, 
hence increasing the value of the funds’ assets (Paramasivan and Subramanian, 2009). A 
closed-ended mutual fund trades as a listed public company. Upon creation, the fund initiates 
a public offering to raise capital, and shares have a fixed supply and maturity period 
(Paramasivan and Subramanian, 2009). 
In 1929, there were an estimated 19 open-ended mutual funds and approximately 700 close-
ended mutual funds across the globe (Rouwenhorst, 2004). Tough economic conditions and 
the 1929 stock market crash led to drastic change. A large number of closed-ended funds 
were wiped out and few open-ended funds managed to survive (Rouwenhorst, 2004). With 
the introduction of Securities Act in 1933 in the United States of America (USA), and the 
Securities Act of 1934 and Investment Company Act of 1940, this industry became more 
regulated and stable. The industry recovered and expanded in the early 1950s, with 100 open-
ended mutual funds emerging in the USA alone. Growth has continued to the present (Huij, 
2007) . 
In South Africa, mutual funds are the organ of Collective Investment Schemes (CIS) which, 
in turn, are an important part of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). The Association of 
Savings and Investment South Africa (ASISA) notes that this industry showed healthy 
growth from 2011Q1 to 2015Q1. It offers portfolio managers and investors a large choice 
when allocating funds. The ASISA 2013 annual report notes that the local CIS industry had 
doubled in size in five years. This suggests that investors have faith and trust in this industry. 
The report also notes that investors invested nearly R1.5 trillion in the local CIS during 2013. 
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The total invested value was R661 billion five years ago. The R177 billion net inflows in 
2013 represented an increase of 47.5% on the 2012 net inflows. As a means of 
diversification, the industry offered investors a wide variety of portfolios, numbering 1 062 in 
2013. Statistics provided by ASISA clearly show the rise and growth of this industry. 
Despite the seemingly relative economic significance of the mutual funds industry, only a 
few scholars have studied this industry. To the best knowledge of the researcher, no previous 
studies have investigated style investing. Du Toit (2012) reported significant value effects 
from all segments of the JSE main board. Another study conducted by Hsieh et al. (2012a) 
showed that four out of the six managers investigated underperformed their respective 
passively-replicated style benchmark. These studies provide a solid foundation for other 
scholars as there is quite a big gap in the literature from the South African perspective. 
Accordingly, this study aims to contribute to the small but growing literature on style 
investing from the South African perspective. 
1.2 Background of the study  
 
The unit trust investment vehicle has been significant in well-developed capital markets since 
the 1990s (Njeri, 2012). As one of the world’s most developed capital markets, South African 
CIS are growing aggressively. The figure below, drawn using values sourced from ASISA 
(2015) shows how this industry grew from 2011 to 2015. It uses only Rand (R) dominated 












Figure 1: CIS overview  
 
 
Data sourced from www.asisa.org.za  
The figure above reveals a surge in both total assets under management and the number of 
unit trust portfolios in South Africa.  
Unit trusts can best be defined as private engagements that pool funds and resources from 
different types of savers to generate a large pool of funds which they then invest in different 
kind of assets like small caps, large caps, the money market, bonds and property  with the aim 
of generating higher returns (Njeri, 2012). Unit trusts can therefore be seen as a vehicle to 
achieve wide diversification and higher returns for small investors who may only have small 
sums of money to invest (Thomas, 2012).  Investments are made on behalf of contributors 
that can also be regarded as investors (Njeri, 2012). They are therefore not involved in day to 
day decisions about how and where their money is invested. The types of asset classes or 
products chosen by investors largely depend on their appetite for risk, financial goals, time 



































Within the funds industry, portfolio managers and investors have come up with a simple way 
of dissecting assets and groups or classifying them according to their behaviour, relationship, 
performance and their ability to grow in the future. When portfolio managers and other 
financial experts create portfolios, they first decide what types of assets to invest in and what 
proportion of the money to put in a single asset incorporated in their funds (Barberis and 
Shleifer, 2003). In other words, they group all similar assets into broad groups and name 
these groups according to the types of constituents held in each group. These groups may 
range from value stocks, to growth stocks, small-cap stocks, mid-cap stocks, large-cap stocks, 
government bonds, real estate and venture capital. These asset classes are termed “styles” and 
the process of allocating funds across styles, rather than among individual securities, is 
known as style investing (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003). In this sense, investors who distribute 
their money across style levels rather than individual asset levels are called style investors. 
Style investing refers to “a manager’s adherence to some pre-defined specific asset allocation 
strategy” (Ahmed and Nanda, 2001: 1). The procedure of style investing can be used to 
identify the strategies and direction taken by each mutual fund. As suggested by Wahal and 
Yavuz (2013), this technique may hold very useful predictive powers, especially when it 
comes to predicting returns. 
Given the large pool of stocks, portfolio managers have a choice of wide-ranging strategies. 
These managers can either be active or passive. Active managers strive to beat the market 
index through frequent buy and sell strategies while passive managers do not make any 
attempt to beat the market index; rather, they buy and hold stock for a prolonged period of 
time (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003, D’Arcangelis and Rotundo, 2014). In addition, some 
managers believe they have selectivity skills, i.e., they have the ability to spot stocks that will 
grow and generate profits. All these strategies have advantages and disadvantages that will be 
discussed further in the literature review. 
The concept of behavioural finance also has much influence in style investing because 
managers are evaluated by comparing them to their peers. Peer comparison influences 
managers to introduce herding behaviour in the market in that they do what their peers do in 
order to revive their careers even if they do not believe in the strategies implemented by their 
peers (Gilmour and Smit, 2002). Pressure from external investors sometimes forces managers 
to change the initial mandate of investing in a specific style and drift to other winning styles 
in order to generate higher returns (Wermers, 2012). The phenomenon of drifting sometimes 
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has negative results for investors because it kills diversification from an investor’s point of 
view. It is detrimental if the drift goes to the style where investors also invested in a drive to 
diversify their investment. Since drifts are not disclosed, if they go to other styles of 
investment, investor diversification is deterred and investors are placed at a disadvantage if 
that style sustains a negative shock (Wermers, 2012).  
Mutual funds have their roots in portfolio selection which was proposed by Markowitz 
(1952). Markowitz believed that the process of building a portfolio starts with observing the 
performance of a certain security and ends with making future predictions about that security. 
After observing and making predictions, the next stage is to choose the portfolio to place such 
security. In adding securities to a portfolio, the manager takes a broad look at changes in 
expected returns and discounted future returns against the variance of the portfolio which 
symbolises the total risk involved. Here, the rule of thumb is that managers must invest in 
stocks that have a maximum discounted value. However, the computation of the discounting 
factor is a problem since it cannot be done with certainty (Williams et al., 2012). 
Consequently, portfolio managers never score similar total returns at the end of the financial 
year.   
Style investing has been praised for classifying comparable securities into a style, thus 
making it easy for the performance of the fund to be measured, by comparing it to the 
respective index (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003). The fact that portfolio managers invest funds 
on behalf of other investors introduces the element of the agency problem. It has been found 
that, in most cases, managers follow their mates or peers due to the fear that, in the end, 
investors will compare their manager’s performance with their peer group. Chen and De 
Bondt (2004) found that, in extreme cases, managers would forgo their co-strategies and 
follow the dominant strategy in the market in order to remain competitive and appeal to 
investors. 
The existence of external influence and the manager’s own psychological considerations can 
best be described by behavioural finance. Ricciardi and Simon (2000) describe behavioural 
finance as a conviction that psychological considerations are an essential feature of security 
markets. This school of thought seeks to explain how emotions, human beliefs and investors’ 
mental mistakes affect the decision-making process (Banerjee, 2011). 
The concept of style investing was first proposed by Sharpe (1992). Since then, it has gained 
much popularity and many scholars have studied style investing from the perspective of 
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different international markets. Evidence of style investing will be discussed in greater detail 
in chapter 2. 
1.3 Aim of the study 
 
This study aimed to establish the tendency of style drift in South African mutual funds and 
the long run relationship between South African indices. The relationship or lack thereof will 
further assist in the analysis of diversification possibilities through investing in funds that 
track different and non-co-integrated indices. 
1.4 Concept statement and objectives   
 
One of the key points in the investment literature is diversification; as investors would say, 
“do not keep all your eggs in a single basket”. Unit trusts are often seen as the answer to this 
phenomenon as they have the ability to invest in many stocks with less starting capital 
requirements. The problem arises when investment is made through style investing, where 
one invests in many stocks with the same characteristics and almost the same performance in 
different prevailing economic cycles. Again, a solution to this manifestation is to invest in 
different investment styles which display largely different fundamentals and performance.  
The finance literature postulates that some styles are deemed the opposite of each other and 
are thus negatively correlated. A negative correlation between indices is believed to be the 
best case scenario since negative disturbance or shock in one style will not have spillover 
effects on the other (twin) since they are negatively correlated. However, this is very 
theoretical, and a fund’s style is entirely up to fund manager’s selection and philosophy. 
The interdependence between styles and sectorial indices in South Africa has not received 
much attention. If some investments are repeated in many styles (which is the case in the 
South African stock market, where some shares in different sectorial indices also appear in 
small caps and the top 40), a negative shock to some stocks will obviously affect many styles 
and pose a threat to investors who strive to diversify their investment by investing in different 
indices. Following the growth of CIS, it is therefore important to establish how correlated 
styles and local indices are within the economy since they are used as a starting point and 
benchmark when assigning asset allocation weightings and modeling risk. Moreover, it is 
important to determine if fund managers actually follow promised/ advertised mandates 
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conveyed by the name of the fund and select assets that truly belong to that particular style 
when allocating assets (investors’ funds). 
 
This research study sought to empirically determine the nature of possible diversification that 
can be obtained in the asset management industry by achieving the two following objectives:  
 To analyse the long-run relationship between six different JSE indices (i.e., value, 
growth, small cap, large cap, industrials and resources); and 
 
 To investigate and analyse the presence, causes and duration of style drift in the 
sampled funds that constitute the aforementioned six indices. 
 
By establishing the patterns between changes in long- run relationships and style drift, the 
study addressed the following questions: 
 What is the long-run relationship between investment styles and selected sectorial 
indices in the South African stock market?  
 Can diversification be achieved by investing in different styles and funds replicating 
different indices in South Africa? 
 Does style drift in South Africa follow any pattern? 
 Do fund managers make attempts to control style drift? 
1.5 Significance of the study  
 
This study was motivated by information provided by ASISA which clearly illustrates that 
CIS in South Africa are growing at a faster rate than ever before. As noted earlier, it is 
important to determine the relationship between funds and indices of investments. This 
enables investors to select appropriate strategies to diversify their investment. Furthermore, 
this study sought to determine the relationship between a fund and its twin and other sectorial 
indices. The literature posits that a fund and its twin are negative reflections of each other in 
all aspects. However, this hypothesis remains untested in the South African market. Testing 
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the long-run relationship in conjunction with style drift and stock picking provides better 
insight into the possible level of diversification and thus reduces risk.  
 
1.6 Research methodology  
 
In order to achieve the study’s two objectives, two different models were used to provide 
solid, combined conclusions. The absence of long-run relationships are crucial for portfolio 
diversification. On the other hand, asset allocation is also important for portfolio 
diversification and superior performance. The study was consequently built on these two 
different complementary angles of portfolio diversification objectives. It is underpinned by 
the Engle-Granger two-step procedure to establish long-run relationships. This model was 
used in the form of a bivariate model to establish long-run relationships between six selected 
South African indices over a period of eight years. In line with Khan (2011), daily data was 
used to research long-run relationships between indices. Khan (2011) proposed that 
information flows instantly in financial markets. Therefore, it is necessary to use daily data 
because market participants, in turn, process information as it flows in.  
Following the long-run relationship investigation, the study used Sharpe’s (1992) asset class 
factor model to establish how managers allocate funds between stocks that constitute the six 
indices used in this study. Through returns, this model clearly shows which index each 
mutual fund follows in the selected sample. The results from both models thus provide all-
inclusive views of long-run relationships between indices and how managers allocate funds in 
the presence of the discovered relationship. Data points and how data was collected will be 
further illustrated in Chapter 3.    
1.7 Outline of the study  
 
The remaining chapters of this study are structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents a literature 
review which is divided into the theoretical framework and empirical evidence. Chapter 3 
discusses the research methodology employed for the study and the data sources. Chapter 4 
presents and analyses the results and Chapter 5 provides conclusions and the 
recommendations arising from the findings.      
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1.8 Chapter summary  
 
Chapter 1 provided the introduction and background of this study. The key words and 
concepts (i.e., style investing, style drift and mutual funds) that are relevant to this study were 
introduced.  Having highlighted the problem and questions related to this study, the local and 



















CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Introduction  
 
This study evaluated style investing and style drift from the perspective of the South African 
market. This chapter reviews the previous local and international literature in this field. The 
literature review provided the researcher with a clear picture of what factors to take into 
consideration as the study progressed further to conduct tests. This chapter examines the 
theoretical framework of style investing and mutual fund operations. Thereafter, the 
empirical evidence is reviewed and reported. The review is not confined to current models, 
but travels back in time to the roots of the models utilised in this study. This chapter further 
reviews the findings of previous studies and identifies areas of agreement and disagreement. 
2.2 Theoretical framework 
 
The performance of funds and investment strategies has been a focus area for financial 
experts and scholars for many years. The large number of investment strategies and constant 
innovation has led to an increasing number of financial products. One of the most 
acknowledged products are mutual funds’ investments, which are referred to as unit trusts or 
CIS in South Africa. Mutual funds are much praised and utilized to achieve diversification. 
Moreover, these funds are managed by highly qualified professionals and investors are 
therefore promised quality service (Sarpong and Sibanda, 2014).  Mutual funds can either be 
actively or passively managed. Active managers always strive to beat the market index 
through frequent buy and sell strategies while passively managed funds are dominated by buy 
and hold investment strategies. It is worth noting that mutual fund managers will always seek 
the best possible strategies to deliver superior returns, irrespective of whether they are active 
or passive managers.  
2.2.1 Concept of style investing and mutual funds  
 
The concept of style investing was proposed by Sharpe (1992). Sharpe (1966) and, later,  
Jensen (1968) focused on the performance of mutual funds in order to gauge the selectivity 
skills of managers and their results and conclusions are still relevant in current markets and 
are hardly challenged. Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1968) compared mutual funds’ 
performance against their respective market benchmark. They concluded that managers do 
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not possess the necessary selectivity skills to produce superior returns and that returns based 
on selectivity skills do not persist (Brown and Harlow, 2002). Jensen (1968) founded the 
philosophy of asset pricing which emphasizes the grouping of assets according to their 
corresponding systematic risk levels. 
Selectivity skills can play a major role in style investing, but investment style also has a 
significant, direct influence on how fund returns are derived, i.e., style itself, structure, 
market operations and constituents. Basu (1977) seminal study documented the benefits of 
grouping assets with the same firm-related attributes into a single portfolio (e.g., market 
capitalization and book-to-value). Since such grouping is a partial definition of style 
investment, returns on a single investment in a fund will be highly correlated to its index, 
and, if this is true, there will be high significant value of β (beta) between the asset and the 
index and greater weighing will be given to that investment in the portfolio. However, styles 
consist of dynamic investment strategies rather than the pure buy and hold method or 
relatively fixed portfolio weights (Brown and Goetzmann, 1997). These strategies may range 
from rebalancing, to selling and dividend pay-outs. 
2.2.2 Strategic asset allocation and psychological considerations  
 
A mutual fund is created by adding different assets with related behaviour to one portfolio. 
Hence, a mutual fund is assumed to have its roots in asset allocation as proposed by 
Markowitz (1952). Harry Markowitz introduced the Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) in 
1952. It is based on the notion that investors can create an optimal portfolio by holding 
diversified assets with different risks (Markowitz, 1952). In this efficient portfolio, the 
returns on a single asset are less important than how that asset’s value moves against the 
overall portfolio value. What really matters is that each portfolio must deliver the highest 
expected return at the lowest risk possible (Ricciardi and Simon, 2000).  However, an 
efficient portfolio is deemed partially unattainable in style investing since external investors 
have much influence on the stocks picked by portfolio managers (Pástor and Stambaugh, 
2002). 
Chan et al. (2002) state that managers may do what is deemed irrational simply because they 
do not want to deviate from the benchmark and thus, discard the possibility of an efficient 
portfolio. Chan et al. (2002) referred to this phenomenon as “bunching at the centre”. The 
strength of the agency problem is further intensified by the fact that the manager’s 
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performance is evaluated in comparison to the performance and strategies of his / her peers. 
Such scrutiny from outside investors is more likely to bring about herding in the market. 
In the portfolio management and trading environment, financial experts are believed to trade 
or make decisions based on two strategies, momentum and contrarian strategies. Momentum 
investors tend to follow previous positive trends in the hope that such trends will persist in 
the future; they believe that if they buy now, they will sell at even higher prices in the next 
trading term (Schwager, 2012). On the other hand, contrarian investors will move in the 
opposite direction from momentum investors in the hopes that their decisions are wrong and 
that they will make a profit when there is price reversal shortly after momentum investors 
realise they made a mistake (De Bondt and Thaler, 1987). Momentum strategies attract a vast 
number of uninformed and irrational investors who join this flow to make profits. This is best 
known as herd behaviour. In terms of the contrarian strategy, the investor buys when the herd 
is selling and sells when the herd is buying (Sarpong and Sibanda, 2014). Herd behaviour is 
best understood by studying the concept of behavioural finance.  
Ricciardi and Simon (2000) describe behavioural finance as the notion that psychological 
considerations are an essential feature of security markets. This school of thought seeks to 
explain how investors’ emotions, beliefs and mental mistakes affect the decision-making 
process. It strives to provide evidence that mispricing of stocks and deviations from efficient 
market hypotheses (EMH) stem from the fact that markets suffer the most from human 
physiological considerations and external influence. Ross et al. (2008)  describe EMH as a 
condition where market and share prices are fairly priced in which no arbitrage opportunities 
exist.  
One of the basic assumptions made in economics and finance is that the markets are efficient 
and investors are rational at all times (Yalçın, 2010). Consequently, behavioural finance 
scholars have devoted much time and effort to producing substantial empirical evidence that 
markets are not efficient and investors have many biases that result in non-optimal decisions. 
It is further argued that even if mispricing can be identified in the market, exploiting it and 
driving prices to their intrinsic value can be very difficult (Williams et al., 2012). Bodie et al. 
(2010) maintain that this is solid proof that refutes the efficient market hypothesis. If market 
anomalies exist, prices and asset allocation cannot follow the trends predicted by EMH. 
Behavioural finance is a broad field that explores how market decisions are made. For the 
purpose of this study, only a few behavioural forces are reviewed.  
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Many financial experts have studied different economies across the world to identify possible 
herd trading which is largely driven by behavioural finance biases. Demirer and Kutan (2006) 
analysed China’s stock market, the Shanghai composite and found no evidence of herd 
trading in this market. In contrast, Tan et al. (2008) found that the Shanghai market suffered 
from herd trading. With regard to the South African market, Sarpong and Sibanda (2014) 
produced evidence of contrarian investors scoring superior returns, which correspondingly 
means that there is herd trading in this market since contrarian investors benefit from the 
mistakes made by herd investors. 
According to Swenson (2000), institutional investors ought to abide by static asset allocation. 
However, style allocations tend to vary with the style performance cycle. Fama and French 
(1992a) assert that efficient market theorists believe that the style cycle must at all times 
mirror changes in style risk and fundamentals. However, La Porta et al. (1997) and 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) suggest that that these style cycles can, to a large extent, advance 
due to irrational factors unrelated to risk or fundamentals as per behavioural finance theories. 
La Porta et al. (1997)  and Lakonishok et al. (1994) developed the Local Stochastic Volatility 
(LSV) models which maintain that growth stocks are, in most cases, overvalued by naïve 
investors who put more emphasis on the past growth rate when estimating future returns, 
leading to higher bid prices. 
While the LSV measure demonstrates the misevaluation of growth stocks, Barberis and 
Shleifer (2003) developed the B-S behavioural model to explain the style performance cycle. 
The B-S model mainly seeks to explain superior returns on value stocks. It further supports 
the notion that such superior returns are the direct result of contrarian investors or traders 
who recognise and exploit misevaluation and mispricing between growth and value stocks. 
Simply put, the B-S model includes style value traders and contrarians whose asset 
allocations are inversely related to the most recent performance (Teo and Woo, 2004).  
 2.2.3 Risk and return factors in style investing  
 
Scher and Muller (2005) describe style investing as a growing and significant investment 
vehicle that is both a source of returns and a risk factor. Style is regarded as a source of 
returns since many managers and investors seek strategies that will enhance alpha, which 
represents the intercept in the regression model. Pástor and Stambaugh (2002) explain alpha 
as the figure that shows managers’ skill in selecting the mispriced stock that is ultimately 
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included in their portfolios. Style investing is regarded as one way to invalidate this 
argument. In cases where investors opt to invest in value stocks during a period when value 
style outperforms other styles, the value of alpha will be enhanced for every investment in 
value stock (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2002, Scher and Muller, 2005, Li et al., 2014). On the 
other hand, style is also viewed as a risk factor. It is suggested that asset pricing and 
performance measurement based on absolute returns are no longer efficient. Hence, the risk 
introduced by active conduct in the quest for returns cannot be ignored (Scher and Muller, 
2005, Wahal and Yavuz, 2013). 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) introduced the concept of returns on single or 
combined assets as compensation for the market risk borne by investors. Simply put, the 
CAPM asserts that investors need to be compensated by factoring the risk and time value of 
money (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2002). In addition, the CAPM proposes that these returns 
must exceed the risk-free rate and must be directly proportional to the investment sensitivity 
to market risk displayed by beta (β). More recently, it has been found that style investing 
alone can enhance returns, while unique style characteristics, operations and cyclical 
behaviour can introduce additional risk that cannot be factored into market risk with certainty 
(Scher and Muller, 2005, Li et al., 2014). Fama and French (1992b) demonstrated that 
variations in returns may be the direct result of style factors. Thus, it is crucial to 
acknowledge style as a source of risk. It is for these reasons that measurement models of 
investment performance started to incorporate style as a risk factor in order to better measure 
and explain performance. Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) are amongst the 
scholars who documented these findings. It is, therefore, held that performance persistence 
studies that do not adjust for style risk or even market risk can result in incorrect estimation 
of performance persistence (Kahn and Rudd, 1995, Wermers, 2003, Barras et al., 2010). 
2.3 Prior literature and empirical evidence 
 
2.3.1 Styles investing explained  
 
Portfolio managers classify assets into different groups such as value and growth stock, large-
cap, mid-cap, small-cap and government bonds, etc. After categorising assets into classes, 
they then allocate funds across all the classes identified (Bernstein and organizacija 
kompozitora Jugoslavije, 1995, Chen et al., 2013). Barberis and Shleifer (2003) show that 
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assets or stocks compressed in the same style behave in the same way and thus share common 
characteristics that can be attributed to fundamentals, markets and law. They further stipulate 
that some classes are temporary, while others are permanent. Temporary styles are 
experienced during unusual conditions or popular conditions in the business cycle. A 
practical example of a temporary style is a style that may eventually emerge during a bubble 
and may suddenly disappear after the bubble bursts. In addition, new investment styles may 
be created due to recent innovation in the financial markets (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003). 
The bottom line is that style is made up of stocks that possess same similarities regardless of 
the state of the economy (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003). Due to this constraint, it is expected 
that assets in the same style will be correlated and produce nearly the same relative cash 
flows and returns. Thus, if the style is made up of technology stocks and this sector faces a 
negative economic shock, it is unrealistic to expect that some technology stocks will produce 
positive returns while others will produce negative returns, as they are in the same style and 
industry or sector. 
2.3.2 Birth and demise of styles  
 
Herd behaviour during an economic bubble may give birth to a new style which could 
disappear after the burst (Cooper et al., 2005, Maor, 2014). Moreover, a style may be created 
after good news is received about a certain particular stock. A typical example is the birth of 
the small stock style which was discovered directly after the documentation of the small-firm 
effect (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003). Likewise, bad news may lead to the death of a style. 
When good news about a certain style hits the market, many investors will opt to invest in 
that style; this drives stock prices to higher levels until the style reaches maturity. Investors 
will be thrilled to be part of this price hike, and the style will face a dead end after all the 
fruits have been harvested and will ultimately disappear. Furthermore, the style may reach a 
dead end due to poor performance and when arbitragers move prices back to their true 
intrinsic value. However, this only happens if there was mispricing of constituents in the first 
place which, to a certain extent, is more likely to be present in glamour stocks (Barberis and 
Shleifer, 2003). 
When a style performs poorly, there is always the alternative of changing its name, which 
signifies a move away from a style with a low premium towards one with a corresponding 
higher current premium (Cooper et al., 2005). Cooper et al.’s (2005) study analysed the 
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significance of changing names on cash flow and overall returns. Their findings revealed 
significant changes in cash flows just after the name change even if fund managers did not tilt 
constituents to be in line with the new style reflected by the new name. This finding does not 
justify the suggestion that some investors’ decisions are mainly affected by herding and 
irrationality rather than the fundamentals. The fact that Cooper et al. (2005) found a 
significant increase in cash flows without managers investing in constituents that are reflected 
by the new name suggests that investors channel funds without a thorough fundamental 
analysis.  
There are two types of name changes, namely, cosmetic and non-cosmetic (Cooper et al., 
2005). Cosmetic refers to a name change that is followed by a new investment style and 
changes in fund constituents. Non-cosmetic is when the change in the fund name is not 
followed by changes in investment style and no changes in funds’ holdings or constituents 
(Cooper et al., 2005).  It can thus be concluded that non-cosmetic name change is mainly 
supported by irrational investors who are affected by financial biases which can be better 
understood by studying the concept of ‘behavioural finance’.  
A practical example of a non-cosmetic name change is provided by Ahmed and Nanda (2001) 
and Wine and Sullivan (2001) who noted that after the burst of the technology bubble, 
managers changed the fund’s name to mirror a move away from technology stocks to value 
stock even though the fund’s constituents were never changed. During this period, name 
changes were very common. Fund managers will always change the name to imitate current 
business sentiment which may range from “small-cap”, to “mid-cap”, “large-cap”, “value 
sock”, “growth stocks”, “technology”, “resources”, or “industrials”. Cooper et al. (2005) add 
that name changes mostly take the form of switching from a “cold style”, which is a style that 
experiences hardship in cash flows to a “hot style”, which is a style that recently produced 
positive returns. 
2.3.3 Shift in style and factors influencing style drift 
 
Cooper et al. (2005) produced strong evidence that mutual funds are likely to go as far as 
altering their names to benefit from the prevailing hot style. This is usually harmless to 
investors who channel funds to portfolio managers with the aim of achieving growth and 
higher returns on their initial investment amounts. Typical examples of such investors are 
individuals who make early investments in their pension funds. Wermers (2010) maintains 
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that fund shareholders and pension sponsors base their investment decisions on the 
information advertised and provided in the name of the fund. Non-cosmetic name change is, 
therefore, a threat to investors who are financially literate, who channel funds to managers 
with the aim of investing in their favourite stock only to find that managers did otherwise 
(Cooper et al., 2005).  
Chan et al. (2002) assert that cosmetic name change is the best option. They note that fund 
managers must be transparent and replicate the constituents reflected in the name of the fund 
because these constituents must paint a picture of investment strategies at a given date. 
Therefore, the features or portfolio holdings must reflect an up-to-date investment style at all 
times. 
The agency problem is among the many factors that contribute to a shift in style. Due to the 
fact that poorly-performing funds risk losing investors, managers are left with no choice but 
to try something different in order to revive their careers (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003). Thus, 
they will not hesitate to withdraw funds from cold styles which are deemed to be delivering 
lower returns and start investing in hot styles. When managers withdraw funds from cold 
styles to invest in hot styles, they withdraw them from a twin fund which is explained as the 
opposite of the fund to which the money is channelled (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003). Many 
investment strategies come in pairs. According to Barberis and Shleifer (2003), securities that 
share the same positive qualities create one style while  those that share the same negative 
qualities make up a twin. In other words, a single style and its corresponding twin are the 
opposite of each other. Having said this, cash flows and returns on a single style are the direct 
opposite of cash flows and returns on the corresponding twin style. In this sense, when the 
growth style is over performing, the value style is expected to underperform since they are 
deemed opposites. This reasoning adds to the literature that seeks to explain why they are 
many name changes in the funds market. When there is a boom in a particular style, there is a 
corresponding burst or drought in a twin style where managers may, sooner or later, opt to 
changing the name rather than letting it fade away. 
Cooper et al. (2005) maintain that name changes that are not accompanied by changes in fund 
holding generate higher cash flows, especially if the name reflects the hot style and if 
managers spend more on marketing the new name. Furthermore, Cooper et al. (2005)  state 
that there is no relationship between cash flows and returns such that an increase in cash 
flows does not lead to improvements in performance. Thus, managers may eventually opt to 
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hold many different, diversified stocks at one time to try to compensate for poor fund 
performance. Consequently, they participate in “style drift”.  
Style drift is described as the propensity on the part of fund managers to change from one 
style to another (Wermers, 2010). Wermers’s (2010) study displays that style drift has been 
discovered in South Africa and at the global level. The tendency to drift is so strong that even 
self-declared styles tend to stray from their name and promised mandate. The literature 
reveals that labour incentives may play a major role in allowing managers to deviate from 
their given mandate. Style drift may also arise due to the fact that the characteristics of stocks 
change constantly. A typical example is when a manager invests in a small-cap style, and, as 
time goes by, this may substantially change to mid-cap due to investments from outside 
investors. In this scenario, there will be style drift even when a manager passively holds the 
same stock over time. This is confirmed by Khorana (1996) who used statistical measures R 
squared and tracking error (TE) to check which asset classes diverged the most from their 
mandates. The study found that large-cap funds tend to have higher investment or style 
consistency than small-cap and mid-cap funds. In addition, large cap funds were found to 
have lower expense ratios on average because of their style consistency.   
It has been argued that, in most cases, style drift tends to positively affect the performance of 
a portfolio manager. Wermers (2010) postulated that managers are sometimes better off 
holding a vast number of shares or styles. This argument builds on the dimensions of 
profitability derived from economies of scale which is referred to as “economies of style”. 
The study also found that managers find themselves in a fruitful position if they broaden their 
investment spectrum. This suggests that managers might be better off if they reduce their 
investment in some styles and invest in other previously ignored styles.  
Furthermore, Wermers (2010) argues that some managers possess a measure of neutrality that 
causes them to make an effort to identify mispriced stocks and take advantage of them 
irrespective of their style. Such managers are ready to take up any opportunity that prevails in 
the market at the time rather than restricting themselves to a certain style. Drifting from one 
style to another is more likely when opportunities exist in the area of a manager’s expertise. 
Another motivation for style drift is that styles deliver different returns over time (Wermers, 
2010). What was accepted as the best strategy or style a year ago may be completely 
ineffective in the current and following years. 
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Chen and De Bondt (2004)  paper on “Style momentum within the S & P - 500 index” 
provides concrete evidence that growth stocks outperformed value stocks during the period 
1998 to 1999. However, this did not last long, as today’s value style is deemed a winning 
style. This demonstrates that no style or mix of instruments will ever be a winning strategy in 
all market conditions or business cycles. Hence, managers always need to be ready to try to 
take advantage of prevailing market conditions and adjust their holdings when necessary. 
Over the years, it has become the norm for expert portfolio managers and beginners to chase 
whatever style delivered good returns in the recent past (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2002). This 
stems from the agency problem explained in the section on behavioural finance. Since fund 
managers compete for fund flows and, hence, investors, they diverge from their beliefs to 
meet the needs of investors and, therefore, adjust their investment strategies (Chen and De 
Bondt, 2004). It is for this reason that Wermers (2010) found that most managers put less 
effort into controlling for style drift as long as they deliver good returns to their investors. 
Consequently, these managers are not inclined to revert to the desired style. Moreover, the 
literature documents that consistently reverting to the desired style does not necessarily 
provide higher returns (Wermers, 2012).  
Teo and Woo (2001) suggest that there is a connection between performance persistence and 
investment style in the sense that future returns may mimic past returns. After testing this 
hypothesis, they concluded that past winners and losers mimic their previous performance. 
These findings support style drift if a fund delivered poor previous performance. Even though 
Teo and Woo (2001) support managers who execute style timing, the real relationship 
between style consistency and fund performance is unclear.    
Style drifting is mainly associated with active trading (Wermers, 2010). Managers that 
practise frequent, active trading find themselves managing drifting portfolios. However, 
active trading itself poses the problem of increasing correlation between previously un-
correlated stocks which can introduce unforeseen risk. Wermers (2010) notes that investors 
who practise active trading, be it as a result of overconfidence or expertise, have a good 
history in portfolio management since they often produce higher returns. Chen and De Bondt 
(2004) add that approaches which rely on buying stocks that are in current favour (past 
winners) and selling those that are deemed to be out of favour (past losers) provide positive 
returns for a time interval of a year and more. These managers are said to achieve higher 
performance levels than their non-drifting colleagues. In contrast, Brown and Harlow (2002) 
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found that style consistent managers deliver higher returns than active managers who drift 
frequently. 
Susceptibility to style drift has its roots in both passive and active components. While there is 
no final consensus on this issue it seems that managers, both active and passive, are 
sometimes forced to engage in active trading to compensate for style drift and possibly 
rebalance the portfolio (Wermers, 2010). Changing from style to style comes with 
administration costs which must be taken into consideration before the drift. Managers of 
small funds are said to practise more style drifting when their funds grow to higher levels and 
they deliver higher positive returns after drifting even after accounting for both trading and 
administration costs (Wermers, 2010). 
Prior to Wermers (2010) study, Brown and Harlow (2002) found that funds that stick to their 
mandate perform better than funds which practise style drift. These contradictory results 
show that markets are susceptible to change within a short period of time. Using the USA 
data set provided by Morningstar for the period 1991 to 2000, Brown and Harlow (2002) also 
concluded that consistent managers produced higher relative and absolute performance than 
their colleagues who relied on style drift. There are three possible reasons for this. 
Firstly, it is expected that funds that resist drift will display a low portfolio turnover which 
will correspondingly result in lower transaction costs than funds that entertain style drift. 
Moreover, Brown and Harlow (2002) demonstrated that reducing turnover and controlling for 
fund expenses are of vital importance if a fund manager is motivated to deliver superior 
performance. Higher portfolio turnover results in higher expenses. With higher investment 
fees, funds that pursue style drift and incur higher turnover rates are more likely to be 
replaced or lose investors (Brown and Harlow, 2002).   
Secondly, fund managers that strive to stick to one mandate experience fewer asset allocation 
errors. Managers that specialize in a single mandate develop more skills in selecting 
securities than those that always try to time their portfolio decisions (Brown and Harlow, 
2002). 
Thirdly, given that investors will always want to evaluate managers’ decisions and 
performance, style consistency is an important tool to combat this agency problem since it 
always provides a correct rating index. Evaluation is difficult when a manager has invested in 
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many stocks that belong to different indices. Hence, maintaining style can demonstrate 
managers’ abilities to potential investors (Brown and Harlow, 2002). 
While  Brown and Harlow (2002) and Bubna et al. (2013) reported no benefits of style drift, 
Wermars (2010) reported higher returns for managers who execute style drift. However, 
Verbeek and Wang (2013) mitigated the discrepancies by stating that style drifting and stock 
picking became successful after the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) imposed 
quarterly disclosure requirements on all mutual funds in 2004. This consolidates these two 
contradictory findings, especially because Brown’s study was conducted in 2002, while 
Wermer’s was in 2010. 
2.3.4 Performance and stock selection   
 
Style consistency does not necessarily mean a buy and hold investment strategy, but refers to 
the tendency to consistently invest in the same style.  
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) suggest the reasons why style investing is prevalent among 
individual and institutional investors, especially in the recent past. Firstly, the construction of 
asset classes helps investors to examine the performance of mutual fund managers in 
comparison with other managers in the same style. This is because style creates a peer group 
of managers who employ similar strategies. Furthermore, the style states the investment 
objective and thus aids the investor’s decision-making (Allen et al., 2010). Nowadays, 
portfolio managers are assessed relative to the performance of a certain benchmark which 
might be a style such as value stocks, growth stocks, large cap, small cap, resources or 
industrials. Secondly, grouping stocks or securities eradicates the situation where there are a 
vast number of stocks to choose from, and allows for information symmetry. Moreover, 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) state that it is much better and easy to choose and invest in six 
styles than to choose from thousands of random-listed securities. For the aforementioned 
reasons, style investing has received much attention over the past decade, albeit with no 
consensus. 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) extend the spectrum of style investing by positing that there is a 
higher rate of correlation between assets that are compressed to constitute a single style. 
Immediately after assets are categorized to one style, they fluctuate more closely with that 
style after classification than before. Consequently, correlation intensifies between assets in 
the same style while it fades away amongst assets in different styles (Barberis and Shleifer, 
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2003). Therefore, assets that are grouped into a precise style should start to co-move with that 
style and other constituents in that style after they are added to the style. 
Having reviewed style investing, it can be concluded that managers tend to be pushed by 
herding behaviour towards investing in past performing styles by simply withdrawing money 
from twin styles. This is done in order to accumulate higher returns since style investing 
yields common factors in the asset returns that are categorised under the same style. These 
higher returns are completely unrelated to cash flows as per Cooper et al. (2005). Further to 
this, Verbeek and Wang (2013) assert that even if mutual funds start investing in other styles, 
in the end, they are able to generate returns that are comparable to their target mutual funds 
after taking into account expenses and transactional costs. 
The literature thus shows that style investing has the potential to create an efficient and 
conducive trading environment which is subject to less risk. However, this is only attainable 
if managers forgo beating the index and try by all means not to stray away but remain near it. 
In this case, the buy and hold strategy (passive trading) will meet the objective. From the 
CAPM and asset allocation theories postulated by Markowitz (1952), a passive investment 
strategy has always reduced the rate of risk that portfolio managers face. However, the 
presence of managers who engage in active trading, like drifting between funds and the rise 
of individual switchers, has introduced high risk in portfolio management (Barberis and 
Shleifer, 2003). Barberis and Shleifer (2003) identify two types of investors in style 
investing, i.e., “fundamental traders” and “switchers”. Fundamental traders are those who 
consistently hold stocks and stick to their estimated target intrinsic value. On the other hand, 
switchers are those that always move to whatever style seems favourable at the time or even 
ahead which is regarded as active trading. Like any other investor, switchers allocate funds to 
a particular style and decide on allocation proportions. In addition, they put more weight on 
figures from the recent past when deciding on their allocation proportions (Barberis and 
Shleifer, 2003).   
Revisiting the case of induced risk and correlation between previously un-correlated stocks 
noted above, one can visualize a scenario with two stocks, i.e., R and S. There is good news 
in the market about stock R, with the existence of switchers in the market. Stock R 
experiences an increase in cash flows through an increase in demand which progressively 
leads to its price deviating from its intrinsic value which is given by fundamentals. If there 
are any limitations in the supply of stock R, its price will keep rising over the price supported 
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by fundamentals. Recalling that there is a style and a twin, the funds used to purchase stock R 
are withdrawn from stock S which is a twin of R. The withdrawal of funds from stock S will 
drive demand and prices down as predicted by the law of demand. A major threat identified 
by Barberis and Shleifer (2003) is that should this so-called good news be based on noise, 
switchers will cause huge destruction in the market.  
They add that, if switchers realize their mistake, the interest in stock R will disappear and 
push prices even lower than they were before the noise. This can be compared to the bursting 
of a bubble. On the arrival of noise, this incident is inevitable and the presence of 
fundamental traders is not enough to stop it. Moreover, as switchers keep choosing stock that 
is in favour, they create correlation between two previously unrelated stocks, leading to calls 
for portfolio rebalancing to all managers (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003, Qiang and Shu-e, 
2009). For these reasons, active trading is seen a root of induced risk in the field of portfolio 
management.  
It make sense to critically analyse style investing in relation to or concurrent with behavioural 
finance. The fact that funds are monitored by managers who are human beings that are 
subject to market pressure and human error means that behavioural finance is relevant.  
There will always be a dispute between investors and fund managers since managers invest 
funds that are not theirs. This introduces the agency problem since investors may want to 
consistently gauge a manager’s performance. Given the theory of returns anomalies in 
financial markets, an investor may expect to see his/her manager follow certain approaches 
that have been proven to produce a higher return mean while the manager might feel that too 
much risk is involved in those strategies (Wine and Sullivan, 2001, Dybvig et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, Chan and Lakonishok (2004) postulate that because portfolio managers fear 
damaging their reputation and career, they may opt to follow approaches that will maintain 
their position near the market benchmark regardless of the rationality or irrationality of those 
approaches. This tendency is described in behavioural finance as obedience, the disposition to 
do inappropriate things or make wrong choices if taught to do so by a specialist, authority or 
represented figures (Ackert and Deaves, 2009). 
Wine and Sullivan (2001) and Chan and Lakonishok (2004) add that managers are also 
examined on the level of their holdings in comparison with their peers’ level of holdings. 
Chan and Lakonishok (2004) investigated the rivalry between value and growth stocks to 
explain why, of all the types of styles, managers may choose to invest in growth to revive 
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their careers. They found that growth stocks are usually chosen because of their favourable 
history of good returns. Thus, they are a good weapon to combat the agency problem, 
enhance the manager’s reputation and revive their career.  
On the other hand, value stocks are neglected because they are regarded as stocks that have 
recent bad performance but with room for improvement and these stocks are regarded as 
posing a higher risk than growth stocks. In other words, value stocks may take some time to 
deliver good positive returns and they pose a threat if investors evaluate managers that 
employ a value strategy compared to managers who follow growth stocks at the prevailing 
time. Factors such as extrapolation bias, herding and behavioural traits remain the pillars for 
managers in choosing growth (value) over value (growth) (Chan et al., 2002). Extrapolation 
is the process of estimating value or facts beyond the original range on the basis of a 
relationship between estimated variables (Klaassen, 2013). Chan et al. (2002) note that the 
phenomenon of “bunching in the centre” may also discourage fund managers from following 
value investing since it is likely to deviate from the overall market index more often before it 
delivers positive returns. 
Another reason for managers to effectively bunch in the centre is that they may employ 
strategies that cannot be easily presented to investors, like book to market analysis. As a 
result, they may opt to invest in well-known stocks that could ultimately create a portfolio 
that does not diverge from the benchmark (Chan et al., 2002). In addition, fund managers do 
not diverge from the strategies implemented by their peers (Banerjee, 2011). By default, 
value stocks become profitable over a wide range of time horizons while growth (glamour 
and past winners) stocks produce instant, positive returns as well as the added advantage of 
price momentum in the short-term. 
2.3.5 Value, growth, and other investment strategies  
 
With regard to value and growth as investment strategies, stocks are classified into two 
categories depending on their characteristics and performance. Value stocks are defined as 
those that have a relatively low market price in relation to some estimation of intrinsic value, 
such as price to book value (P/B), price to earnings (P/E), and price to cash flow (P/C) (Yen 
et al., 2004). It is widely accepted that value and growth style should be based on the ratio of 
book-to-market value (B/M) and small-cap, mid-cap-and large-cap should be distinguished 
based on a firm’s market capitalization (Chan et al., 2002). These key criteria are said to be 
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useful indicators of style. However, in a few cases, this theory might not hold. Chan and 
Lakonishok (2004) demonstrate a typical situation where such belief might not hold. They 
note that some stock would be deemed cheap stock by looking at its book to market ratio 
when other explanatory variables, like dividends and earnings relative to price, might make 
the stock less attractive at face value. They add that such disparity suggests that other 
measures might be useful in figuring out the investment strategies necessary for that stock, 
but not where they really belong. 
In the literature on style investing, much attention has been paid to the competition between 
value stocks and growth stocks. Chan and Lakonishok (2004)  are amongst the scholars that 
have analysed this competition. The value style is favoured for delivering superior returns 
over the growth style. This conclusion was drawn after taking into consideration the financial 
market experience of the late 1990s. 
Chan and Lakonishok (2004) ranked portfolios according to their B/M; the highest ranked 
portfolio was value and the lowest was the glamour portfolio. In terms of returns, the value 
portfolio delivered monthly average returns of 1.83 per cent while the glamour portfolio 
produced a monthly average of 0.30 per cent despite the fact that the market betas were close 
to each other. They used these finding to discount the suggestion that systemic risk plays a 
role in determining a fund’s returns. Such findings can be directly linked to Fama and French 
(1992a) proposition on  the “death of beta”. 
Market anomalies cannot be discounted when discussing the performance of these two 
investment vehicles. Basu (1977) suggested that stocks with lower price/earnings (P/Es) 
usually deliver higher returns than stocks with higher P/Es. Chan et al. (1991) also found 
strong evidence that the value strategy delivers higher returns than the growth strategy. Their 
results were obtained from a detailed investigation of the Japanese market’s past returns. The 
findings were confirmed by Fama and French (1992a) who also found that the value strategy 
produced higher returns due to the increased level of risk, which is in line with the rule of 
thumb: higher risk, higher returns. Chan and Lakonishok (2004) noted that the academic 
community has largely agreed with the proposition that, on average, value strategies do better 
than growth strategies. Having said this, this community is cautioned not to forget 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) finding that cognitive biases drive investor behaviour and that the 
agency problem of portfolio managers discussed earlier was at the root of the so-called higher 
rewards on value investing. The counter argument to these findings is offered by Chan et al. 
27 
 
(1995) who dispute that such bias is strong enough to explain the discrepancy between value 
and growth strategy investing. 
Some scholars have documented that the rewards of value investing exceed those of growth 
investing in the long term. These returns are believed to be both larger and more realistic as 
the investment threshold widens. Rousseau and Van Rensburg (2004) suggest that higher 
rewards compensate for investor patience since their investment period is mandatorily 
required to be long.. Using data from the JSE, Rousseau and Van Rensburg (2004) found 
evidence of low P/E stocks outperforming high P/E stocks after adjusting for risk. The study 
confirmed the presence of the “value” effect and concluded that value stocks yield higher 
returns than growth stocks. 
Chee et al. (2013) define value in terms of the prospective yields implied by current prices 
and the investment’s expected future cash flows. However, purchasing cheap stocks and 
allowing them to gain substantial value over time is not the only aspect of a value investment 
approach (Rousseau and Van Rensburg, 2004). There is a paucity of in-depth studies on the 
well-known fundamental analysis axiom that this investment strategy is best understood as a 
long-run method of delivering higher returns.  The reason for this discrepancy boils down to 
an investor’s psychological considerations and agency costs. The literature on managers’ 
psychological considerations proposes that investment managers tend to rely more on simple 
“heuristics” when they make investment decisions which create the possibility of judgment 
biases during the investment horizon (Chan and Lakonishok, 2004, Banerjee, 2011). More 
precisely, managers tend to extrapolate historical performance too far into the future 
(Ibbotson et al., 2013). This concept of biased extrapolation was confirmed by Chan et al. 
(2003) who documented evidence of biased extrapolation in the pricing of value and glamour 
stocks.  
Rousseau and Van Rensburg (2004) shed light on this on-going debate about value and 
growth stocks from a South African perspective. Using data from the JSE, Rousseau and Van 
Rensburg (2004) analysed trends between low P/E stocks and high P/E stocks. The results of 
the study reveal that there is little difference in the returns of the two stocks in question from 
top to bottom P/E ranked from high, to low, for a period of six months. Noticeably, as the 
time or investment horizon widens, the value portfolios deliver superior returns. These results 
confirm the proposition that value investment is a more reliable source of higher returns in 
increased investment horizons. A significant change or turnover in returns’ distribution is 
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witnessed at a time horizon of 18 months and more. At this time interval, low P/E stocks start 
to outperform high P/E stocks or portfolios. Moreover, the likelihood of low P/E stocks 
outperforming high P/E stocks and benchmarks is found to be significant and strong at the 
time horizon of eighteen months and beyond and comparatively insignificant as the market 
capitalization of the portfolio becomes larger (Rousseau and Van Rensburg, 2004).  
More controversially, the study by Rousseau and Van Rensburg (2004) reports a higher 
standard deviation for smaller value portfolios held for much longer periods. This means that 
the level of risk increases for such portfolios. The same is true for short-term concentrated 
value strategies. This risk is partially associated with the fact that some stocks continue to 
change their characteristics over time, as proposed by Wermers (2010). Rousseau and Van 
Rensburg (2004) note that another reason is that such an event can be linked to the fact that 
the return distribution of these portfolios is skewed which successively leads to higher 
standard deviations being estimated, but this does not necessarily mean an increased 
possibility of downside performance (Rousseau and Van Rensburg, 2004). 
Nonetheless, investing in value stocks and waiting for prolonged periods before the 
investment starts to pay off is deemed a winning strategy. Rousseau and Van Rensburg 
(2004) suggest that rather than simply buying cheap stock to create a value portfolio, one 
should create a portfolio using shares that ware the cheapest 12 months ago because there is a 
strong possibility that current, lower P/E shares may continue to exhibit poor performance. If 
this happens, one will be required to hold this portfolio for a more extended period which 
takes one back to the argument of the risk associated with holding a value portfolio for longer 
horizons.   
Using New York Stock Exchange data, Lakonishok et al. (1994) also documented that value 
stocks outperformed glamour and growth stocks. They note that value stocks report higher 
returns for several years to buy and hold long-term investors. In contrast to Rousseau and 
Van Rensburg (2004), they sorted their data by B/M value. Value stocks outperformed 
growth stocks over a period of five years following portfolio inception. These superior 
returns were obtained after adjusting and controlling for size. Combining and consolidating 
the conclusions of these two studies, one can conclude that value stocks delivered superior 
returns after controlling for difference in size and adjusting for risk. 
Passive buy and hold investors suffered the most during this abnormal state of the economy. 
They were unable to recover due to the limited life span of their assets and personal liquidity 
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constraints. Simply put, these investors couldn’t hold assets for longer horizons. As a result, 
they had to sell at even lower prices and, therefore, incurred losses. This led Faber (2009) to 
regard holding any asset during a global financial crisis as a “decidedly unwise course of 
action”. Earlier, Chua et al. (1987) described the buy and hold strategy as one that offers 
100% (per cent) accuracy in forecasting the bull market and 0% (per cent) accuracy in 
forecasting the bear market. 
Bauman et al. (1998) analysis validates that smaller companies often produce higher returns 
than larger companies in and outside the USA. Since value firms are usually small, it can be 
argued that the value premium may be partially due to the “size effect”. This is confirmed by 
Banz (1981), who documented a relationship between stock returns and the size of the 
company. 
Dechow and Sloan (1997) suggest that the greatest opportunity to earn excess returns in the 
market is when one takes a contrary position against naïve investors who rely more on 
forecasts; they show that this is a special ingredient that is implemented by value strategies 
that, therefore, score more returns. Yen et al. (2004) conclude that value stocks have stronger 
predictive power for earnings in subsequent years, especially during the first two years after 
portfolio inception. Their findings appear to be in line with Fama and French’s (2000) 
findings that showed that earnings and growth rates do not a follow random walk.  
Some investors become excited about the past and current performance of a certain stock and 
quickly start adding it to their baskets, resulting in the overpricing of these stocks (De Bondt 
and Thaler, 1987, Brown et al., 2013). On the other hand, they overreact and abandon stocks 
that perform poorly and thus oversell them; when stocks fall out of favour, they eventually 
experience a severe drop in price. This offers contrarian investors an opportunity to go 
against naive investors and buy most of abandoned under-priced stocks which happen to be 
value stocks, while selling overpriced stocks, thus successfully outperforming the market  
(De Bondt and Thaler, 1987, Brown et al., 2013, Sarpong and Sibanda, 2014). 
Aimed at demonstrating that a strategy that incorporates growth characteristics in value can 
provide superior returns in different investment horizons and business cycles, Ahmed and 
Nanda (2001) study shows that it is sometimes not a good idea to treat growth stocks and 
value stocks as mutually exclusive. Ahmed and Nanda (2001) proposed that growth and value 
can complement each other and produce superior performance.  
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Ahmed and Nanda (2001) argument stems from the fact that indices and mutual funds are 
created using univariate definitions such as B/P and E/P to differentiate growth and value. 
Univariate measures will always treat growth and value as mutually exclusive. Michaud 
(1998) and Brown and Mott (1997) posited that significant measures and superior 
performance can be achieved by incorporating other measurements or dimensions when 
assembling portfolios or style indices. While the notion of incorporating growth 
characteristics in value was not invented by Ahmed and Nanda (2001), it had never been 
tested and thoroughly evaluated. Using data from 1982 to 1997, it was found that 
incorporating growth characteristics in value produces more positive returns than those 
achieved using pure value strategies which are currently deemed to be winning strategies 
(Ahmed and Nanda, 2001).  
Ahmed and Nanda (2001) study also analysed turnover ratio on style portfolios to come up 
with a concrete way of selecting stocks worthy of inclusion in a superior portfolio. They 
found strong evidence that stocks that lie at the centre between value stocks and growth 
stocks tend to produce superior returns. They produce better returns than value and growth 
stocks returns over two years of inclusion in a portfolio. However, this strategy calls for 
portfolio rebalancing every year. They add that “the consistency of this strategy over different 
investment horizons and at different time periods shows that all value stocks may not be 
equal; some are more equal than others” (Ahmed and Nanda, 2001: 3). Cremers and 
Petajisto (2009) added the importance of selection timing if portfolio managers really want to 
beat the benchmark. They propose a different way all together of creating a superior portfolio 
that can beat the respective market benchmark. They assert that fund managers can beat their 
market benchmark by taking positions that are different from the benchmark.  
This section described and explained the common styles available in stocks and capital 
markets. The most common styles are value, growth, contrarian and momentum. 
Furthermore, some styles are purely based on a sector or segment like industrials, resources, 
cash and bonds which are distinguished on the basis of time horizon or maturity. On the other 
hand, some asset allocation strategies are based on market capitalisation like large cap, mid 
cap and small cap. The following section highlights empirical findings from the South 
African market perspective.   




With regard to South African evidence, Hsieh et al. (2012a) confirm international findings 
that equity funds’ superior performance is mainly derived from replicating the style and 
making no attempt to beat the market index through stock picking. Hsieh et al. (2012a) note 
that these findings do not point to any significant variance between global equity funds and 
their corresponding style benchmark. However,  using six well-established South African unit 
trusts, Hsieh et al. (2012a) found that four out of six managers underperformed their 
respective style benchmark. Moreover, they found that stock picking in South African funds 
destroys the value produced by replicating the style index or benchmark. These findings were 
documented after finding that selection return, which are returns in excess of those scored 
through replicating the investment style, are random and insignificant. They thus suggest that 
investors that wish to earn sound returns should passively follow or replicate a particular 
style. Furthermore, investors will be better off if they invest in exchange traded funds (ETFs) 
that passively replicate the mandate of style or market benchmark at minimal cost (Hsieh et 
al., 2012a). 
Active fund managers are praised for exploiting market anomalies and generate superior 
returns. Consequently, they are deemed to possess necessary skills to select stocks that offer 
higher returns. However, the empirical literature does not support this position (Hsieh et al., 
2012a). It is argued that stock picking strategies are ineffective and do not produce returns 
higher than those achieved through replicating the mandate of investment style and market 
benchmark. Sharpe (1992) found evidence that superior returns to mutual funds are due to 
asset allocation rather than stock picking decisions made by fund managers. 
Collinet and Firer (2003) analysed performance persistence between South African funds for 
the period from 1980 to 1999 and concluded that these funds’ past performance tends to 
indicate performance for the following six months. More specifically, if an investor can 
invest in top performing funds for six months and continue rebalancing for the next six 
months, he/she would gain returns that are higher than the average returns of all unit trusts 
after discounting for transaction costs.   
Yu (2008) used three South African indices to analyse the returns of unit trusts, namely the 
JSE Financial Index, the JSE Resource Index and the JSE Industrial Index. In addition to 
these local sector indices, three other style proxies were incorporated: large cap proxy, value 
proxy and the momentum proxy. The study covered the period 2001 to 2006. Yu’s findings 
revealed that there is a strong significant relationship between South African unit trusts and 
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that these investment vehicles leave insignificant residuals. Therefore, Yu’s study also serves 
to confirm the insignificance of selection returns. Thus, stock picking strategies executed by 
active managers do not contribute to their integral investment style returns.   
It is widely accepted in the literature that consumers or investors select investment funds 
based on performance (Bailey et al., 2011, Guercio and Reuter, 2014). They focus on recent 
performance and neglect the recent past. It is for this reason that Meyer (1998) asserts that it 
is important for fund managers to maintain momentum and good track records if they want to 
hold on to their existing investors and attract new investors. Investors flock in the direction 
where the most superior performance is identified.  
It is still unclear which style dominates the other, since the literature documents different 
findings. Some researchers like Bernstein and Jugoslavije (1995) propose that the world may 
witness a reversal in certain investment climates. In search of a superior strategy, Siegel 
(2003) and Scher and Muller (2005) posit that a single style can have a favourable season. 
Furthermore, they stipulate that these periods of style dominance may be short-lived or may 
last for longer investment horizons. This is in line with Campbell et al. (2010) finding that 
performance between styles mostly depends on the nature of stock price movements. 
Scher and Muller (2005) highlighted that, style rotation may sometimes not have a significant 
effect or even be noticed due to the fact that unit trusts keep changing their mandate and 
constituents, especially after rebalancing. This argument stems from the fact that it was found 
that funds with style mandate did not always strictly conform to this mandate (Scher and 
Muller, 2005). However, these findings contrast with those of Lucas et al. (2002), who found 
significant and robust excess returns on funds that implement rotation strategies. Bird and 
Casavecchia (2011) also found that rotation strategies deliver superior performance provided 
certain conditions are met. They note that rotation strategies will not deliver superior 
performance if value and growth portfolios are enhanced using market sentiment and 
financial health indicators (Bird and Casavecchia, 2011). However, the study acknowledges 
that such contrast may be a result of studies being undertaken in different market and 
different economic condition given a wide time frame at which these studies were conducted. 
Since fund managers do not always conform to the funds mandate, therefore the possibility of 
style drift is high. It is therefore of utmost importance, that the relationship between indices 
are examine. This provides a clear picture of how diversification levels are maintained. 
Certain pairs of financial data are expected to be co-integrated or share a similar trend in the 
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long-run. This long-run relationship may be a direct result of the nature of the data used or it 
can  be influenced by market operations (Alexander, 1999). In the short-run, there may be 
deviations, which result in neither a similar trend nor a relationship. However, in the long-
run, these variables may share a similar trend and relationship because of market forces, 
investor tastes and preferences which will restore long-run equilibrium (Ghosh et al., 1999).  
2.3.7 Co-integration and Correlation relevance   
 
Co-integration indicates the presence of common properties between the investigated 
variables. This common property limits independent variation between variables and forces 
them to share similar behaviour and trends (Khan, 2011). Effective risk management requires 
a thorough understanding of the nature of the data series in question (Alexander, 1999). For 
efficient management, volatility, fundamentals, correlations and other related financial 
attributes need to be known with certainty. Knowing the long-run, short-run stochastic trends 
in equity markets is crucial for portfolio managers, policy makers, and investors for pricing 
their assets and for diversification reasons (Kasibhatla et al., 2006). This renders co-
integration analysis important for both short-run and long-run strategies. Portfolio managers 
are, therefore, expected to assign or determine their weights based on the results provided by 
co-integration or correlation models. Co-integration of variables has direct implications for 
diversification opportunities between the variables in question (Khan, 2011). 
Many methodologies can be used to analyse short-run and long-run relationships. However, a 
significant proportion of these models appear to be inefficient and flawed.  Kasibhatla et al. 
(2006) contend that many traditional money managers tend to rely on correlation analyses 
which are performed after differencing the original data series. Kasibhatla et al. (2006) 
strongly criticize this methodology, arguing that time series data lose important long-run 
information after being differenced, thereby rendering the results obtained in correlation 
methods inaccurate and misleading. Granger and Hallman (1991) also criticized the 
methodology of working with returns or differenced data. They showed that asset returns 
have “short memory processes”. Therefore, investment decisions made after consulting short-
run asset returns are inefficient because the asset prices in the long-run are totally ignored 
when they most needed. Furthermore, correlation methodology requires more frequent asset 
rebalancing, whereas co-integration methods do not require rebalancing. 
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Alexander (1999) suggests that correlations are not adequate for risk management because 
they fail to account for lead-lag relationships like price discovery between spots and futures. 
Alexander (1999) also showed that index replication and portfolio optimization using the co-
integration method may simply result in higher returns than the correlation method. Duan and 
Pliska (1998) developed a new method for testing short-run and long-run relationships in the 
securities market. In explaining their methodology, they postulate that, while correlation is 
the best in short-term investment decisions, co-integration methods are accurate in the long-
term. The study concluded that these two methods are complementary and can, therefore, be 
used together to fill loopholes in the time series analysis. This is supported by Fadhlaoui et al. 
(2009) who found that establishing long-run relationships is not sufficient. For better insight 
on diversification opportunities, correlations must be known. If correlation coefficients are 
higher, the gains from diversifying between variables are minimal. On the other hand, if 
correlation coefficients are low, gains can still be acquired from diversification (Fadhlaoui et 
al., 2009).  
Various scholars have found the co-integration methodology to be efficient. Taylor and 
Tonks (1989) suggest that the existence of co-integration infers the desecration of market 
efficiency. In contrast, Fraser and Oyefeso (2005) hypothesize that co-integration does not 
necessarily denote market inefficiency. They believe that if fundamentals in different markets 
are co-integrated, there is a high possibility that their prices are also co-integrated. 
Alexander’s co-integration does not necessarily mean co-movements in returns but simply 
denotes co-movements in asset prices. 
The literature on co-integration reveals interesting but contradictory results.  Corhay et al. 
(1995) conducted a study on five major Pacific-Basin markets and confirmed only one co-
integrating vector. Interestingly, Pan et al. (1999) conducted the very same study four years 
later and reported no co-integration vector between five Pacific-Basin markets. 
Dickinson (2000) found that there was co-integration between European stock markets after 
the 1987 stock market crash but no co-integration vector prior to 1987. In contrast, Chan et 
al. (1997) found no evidence of co-integration between several European stock markets, 
including those that Dickinson studied, especially after the 1987 stock market crash. 
Furthermore, Alexendre and Thillianathan (1995) discovered long-run relationships between 
Asian-Pacific equity markets, but only after the indices were represented in local currency 
and not in common currency. Alexander (2001) thus concluded that co-integration equity 
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markets should be analysed using local currency indices. It is, therefore, necessary to 
continue searching and confirm the existence of the co-integrating vector on a regular basis to 
avoid reliance on flawed and out-dated reports. 
Khan (2011) notes that it is important to consider the nature of the original data when 
searching for co-integration. Furthermore, Khan (2011) believes that it is more acceptable to 
use daily data rather than monthly data when searching for co-integration between stock 
markets. This is because information flows instantly and market participants react very 
quickly to market price information. It is, therefore, important to be aware of the nature of the 
variables and how often they are processed in the market before deciding on data frequency. 
2.4 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter provided the foundation for this study. The literature reveals that there is no 
consensus on the concept of choosing the investment index. Furthermore, there is no 
consensus on which style delivers superior returns. It is for this reason that Wermers (2012) 
suggests that a possible reason for style drift is that funds do not deliver consistent returns 
over time. A number of scholars, like Hsieh et al. (2012b); Ibbotson et al. (2013) and Brown 
et al. (2013) found that investors base their investment decision on the latest returns. 
However, this tends to contradict the fundamentals of growth stocks since they are defined as 
stocks that stand a better chance of growing in a short period of time. Cronqvist et al. (2013) 
dispute that returns are used as the selection criterion. They maintain that investment 
decisions are genetic in the sense that people have an innate preference for existing and 
available indices. 
The literature review provided direction for this study in setting up models that are able to 
deliver efficient and interpretable results. With local scholars having focused on studying 
performance resilience and herding behaviour in the South African market, this study takes 
the unique position of combining long-run relationships and asset allocation with intentions 
to evaluate levels of diversification, thereby leading to the risk faced by investors. 








This chapter describes the sources of data as well as type of data used to achieve each of the 
study’s objectives. The literature review identified appropriate methods for modelling 
different kinds of data. These were used to model different kinds of data for the study’s 
objectives. This chapter describes the kind and frequency of data used as well as data sources 
and data points.  
 
3.2 Data  
 
To achieve the objectives stated in Chapter 1, secondary data was collected, mainly from 
McGregor BFA and ProfileData. Data was collected for a period of eight years, from 2006 to 
2014. The choice of this period was guided by the life span of the sampled unit trusts. Two 
different types of data frequency was collected for the two different objectives. Weekly data 
were collected for the first objective where the ultimate aim was to answer questions related 
to style drift; and daily data were used for the second objective which aimed to evaluate long-
run relationships between selected JSE indices.  
Table 1 below describes the data collected and the frequency used to evaluate both style drift 
and long-run relationships. 
Table 1: Data description  
OBJECTIVE VARIABLE SOURCE PERIOD DATA POINT FREQUENCY 






Last day of the 
week trade (7 day 
week) 
Weekly 






2019 days Daily closing price 
(5 day week). 
Other weeks will 







Table 2: Terms, dates and observations (factor model data) 
CYCLE  START DATE  END DATE OBSERVATIONS 
TERM 1 08-Sep-06 02-Nov-07           61    
TERM 2 09-Nov-07 24-Dec-08           61 
TERM 3 31-Dec-08 19-Feb-10           61 
TERM 4 26-Feb-10 21-Apr-11           61 
TERM 5 29-Apr-11 22-JUN-12           61 






        
          61 
         427 
 
 
Table 2 above provides a breakdown of how the data was separated in order to ensure that 
there were sufficient segregated periods or terms to use in the search for style drift. This is in 
line with Sharpe (1992), who asserted that the minimum efficient number of observations is 
61 in order to obtain meaningful results from the asset class factor model which will be 
explained in the methodology section. Weekly observations were broken down into different 
terms, ensuring a minimum number of 61 observations per term. Terms were arranged in date 
ascending order. This strategy was implemented because this study evaluated style drift from 
the far past to the most recent past. Combining all the observations from the different terms, 
the number of observations amounted to 427 weekly observations.  
To answer questions relating to style drift, and funds’ behaviour and operations, four funds 
per index were selected. These were the top two and bottom two performers per style. A vast 
number of filters were applied to these data. Firstly, funds were selected based on the 
availability of data which had to match the study period. Secondly, the researcher avoided 
selecting funds provided by the same organisation to fill the number one and number two 
spots. Most importantly, data source-provided rankings were used as per the date the data was 
collected to identify the top and bottom achievers. This kind of ranking was provided by 
ProfileData and was obtained directly from this source. It is of the utmost importance to note 
that the rankings and fund performance change from time to time and, hence, a careful 
selection of the top and bottom achievers was crucial. The list of all unit trusts used is 
provided in appendix A. 






                                                                                                          EQ 1     
To evaluate the question of the long-run relationships between South African indices, closing 
prices for the eight-year period in daily frequency were collected, as illustrated in Table 1 
above. The study used six South African indices as follows:  
1. FTSE/JSE LARGE CAP (J200); 
2. FTSE/JSE SMALL CAP (J202); 
3. FTSE/JSE RESOURCES (J210); 
4. FTSE/JSE VALUE (J330); 
5. FTSE/JSE GROWTH (J331); and 
6. FTSE/JSE INDUSTRIALS (J520). 
These indices were selected mainly because the paper seeks to discover if it’s possible to 
diversify stock selection using them should they share a negative performance relationship. 
The same is true for selection of small cap and large caps. The selected indices were therefore 
the perfect place to search for short-run and long-run relationships and the possibility of 
diversifying using deemed negatively co-integrated and related pairs. 
 
Table 3: Daily data cycles (segregated period strategy) 
CYCLE START DATE END DATE OBSERVATIONS 
1ST 2 YEARS 08-Sep-06 05-Sep-08          500 
2nd  2 YEARS 08-Sep-08 07-Sep-10          500 
3rd  2 YEARS 08-Sep-10 07-Sep-12          502 
4th  2 YEARS 10-Sep-12 06-Oct-14          517 
8 YEAR PERIOD 08-Aug-06 06-Oct-14          2019 
 
All data for the six indices were obtained from McGregor BFA and are in daily observations. 
Table 3 above shows the breakdown of the daily data which was broken down into four equal 
cycles, each carrying observations for four different terms, each containing two-year 
observations and an overall cycle consisting of observations for eight years which is the full 
study period. This set up was implemented to answer the question of co-integration 
relationships between selected indices in different time spans or custom periods. This 
arrangement assisted in assessing if diversification can be achieved by investing in different 
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indices in South Africa.  The data set extends from two years before the ‘global credit 
crunch’ to the recovery of the financial markets. Therefore the technique of breaking data 
into four different terms was useful in analysing how the indices related over pre-, during and 
post-recession periods. The total number of observations amounted to 2 019 daily 
observations. In addition, the data set for the “segregation method”, was to be used to 
construct roll-over method cycles by adding two-year observation on top of previous two-
year observations. This provided a holistic view of the continued linear relationship between 
the indices in question. The latter strategy also helped to increase the number of observations 
since co-integration is a long-run occurrence. Table 4 below describes start, end and the 
number of observations for the roll-over strategy. 
 
Table 4: Daily data cycles (roll-over strategy) 
CYCLE START DATE END DATE OBSERVATIONS 
1ST 2 YEARS 08-Sep-06 05-Sep-08          500 
2nd  2 YEARS 08-Sep-06 07-Sep-10          1000 
3rd  2 YEARS 08-Sep-06 07-Sep-12          1502 
8 YEAR PERIOD 08-Aug-06 06-Oct-14          2019 
    
 
This study sought to gain insight into style investing by adopting two objectives. It is 
important to note that each objective required the use of a different methodology; this is 
discussed in the following section. Readers are, therefore, reminded that, for the objective of 
style drift, weekly data was used because the model for style drift requires a minimum of 61 
observations. For the objective of long-run relationship, daily data was collected. Again, this 
is because of the number of observations that needed to be included in the model in order to 
obtain reliable and efficient results. 
Table 5 below tabulates the names of the mutual funds used in this study. Four mutual funds 
were sampled that track selected six South African indices. As noted earlier, FUNDS A and 






Table 5: List and description of mutual funds used 
 
INDICES  FUND A  FUND B  FUND C  FUND D 
         
Large cap   Stanlib ALSI 40 
fund class A   
 Absa large cap 
fund 
 Old Mutual top 
40 fund A     
 Momentum top 40 
index fund 
Small cap  Ned Group 
investment 
entrepreneur 
fund R  
 Old Mutual 
small companies 
Fund R 
 Stanlib small 
cap fund class 
A 
 Coronation smaller 
companies fund 
Resources  Investec 
commodity fund 
class R  




class R  
 Stanlib gold 
and precious 
metal fund class 
R 
 Old Mutual mining 
and resources Fund 
R 
Value  Investec value 
fund class R  
 Element Islamic 
equity fund A  
 Cadiz 
mastermind 
fund class A 
 Marriott dividend 
growth fund class 
R 
Growth  Foord equity 
fund  
 Sim top choice 
equity fund A 
 Investec growth 
fund class A 
 Ned Group 
investment growth 
fund A 









 Stanlib industrial 
fund class R  
 
Different classes of units arise when a manager wants to apply different charges to different 
types of investors. The difference between Class A and Class R is based purely on the fees 
charged by fund managers; it does not have anything to do with asset allocation and 
investment mandates. 
3.3 Methodology  
 
This study aimed to assess asset allocation and co-integration among selected South African 
indices. While these are two very different objectives, they are linked and analysed together 
to describe possible diversification patterns. Therefore, two different methodologies are 
outlined and explained in this section. Firstly, the study used the Engle-Granger two-step 
procedure to test for long-run relationships between six South African indices. Secondly, it 
used the return-based style analysis (Sharpe, 1992), asset class factor model to test for style 
41 
 
drift. The following section describes the methods and models used in this study in detail, 
starting with the co-integration methodology.  
3.3.1 Co-integration  
 
Co-integration is a measure of the long-run relationship between variables. When variables 
are found to be co-integrated, it is concluded that they share long-run relationships. They also 
trend together and share similar behaviour in the long-run. The results of co-integration have 
direct implications for the concept of diversification. In return, diversification ensures proper 
risk management and return maximization (Anderson et al., 2009). Since co-integrated 
variables share a similar trend in the long-run, individuals and investors cannot diversify their 
portfolios by using co-integrated variables because they behave in a similar manner. If 
variables appear to have different long-run trends and behaviour, it means that they cannot 
stay in a fixed long run-relationship, suggesting that they cannot model the long-run (Sjö, 
2008). 
One of the questions this study set out to answer is the level of diversification that can be 
achieved between South African styles.  It therefore sought to answer this question using co-
integration methodologies. The following sub-sections provide detailed information on the 
methods used to study the co-integration relationship of selected South African indices.  
3.3.1 (A) Unit root methodology  
 
When modelling long-run relationships, especially when working with financial data, it is 
important that the behaviour and properties of the data in question are known (Sjö, 2008, 
Brooks, 2008). These properties may range from stationary to non-stationary. Each property 
has its own implications and measure that can be used to adjust for the unwanted attribute in 
the data. To obtain accurate and meaningful results, it is important to ascertain if data is 
stationary or non-stationary before running quantitative and statistical models. To be more 
precise, it is crucial to ascertain the integration order of the series since it is used to set up 
models (Sjö, 2008). Stationary data series, are desirable property, are defined as data that 




The stationarity or otherwise of financial data series plays a significant role in determining 
the behaviour variables in question. A typical example is when variables experience external 
shocks (Brooks, 2008). This shock can stay in the system forever, can gradually decline and 
can gradually increase over time. A best model or data series is when the variables used do 
not store shocks forever but eliminate them as time passes. In such a case, stationary data is 
obtained. The use of non-stationary data in any financial or statistical model runs the risk of 
obtaining inaccurate, false and un-interpretable results (Brooks, 2008, Sjö, 2008).   
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is used to test for stationarity or otherwise in data 
series with the aid of the following equation: 
∆𝑦𝑡 =  𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝑡 + 𝛿𝑦𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑡
ℎ
𝑖=1
                                                                            𝐸𝑄 2 
 
In equation 2, 𝑦𝑡 represents the variable in question at any point in time and t represents time 
index. 𝛼 is the intercept constant called drift,  𝑡 is the time variable, often referred to as trend 
variable. δ  is the focus of the test representing the coefficient process root. 𝛽𝑖  is the 
coefficient on time trend and 𝑡  represents independently distributed residuals and ℎ  is a 
static term (Gujarati and Porter, 2009a). 
In the above equation, the null hypothesis is  H0 : δ = 0  (i.e., variable is not stationary), 
against H1: δ < 0  (i.e., variable is stationary). If the variable is stationary at level, it is called 
I(0) series. If the variable becomes stationary after being differenced once, it is called I(1) 
series.   
The main idea behind the ADF test is to investigate the effect of previous shocks on current 
value. Nevertheless, the ADF test is suspect when the sample period includes major events 
like oil shocks and depression (Gallo et al., 2007). Failure to consider it properly can lead to 
erroneous conclusions where the null hypothesis is improperly rejected or not rejected. It was 
expected that this test would be successful in this study since South Africa did not experience 
any extreme event in the period covered, with the exception of the 2008 financial crisis which 
was felt worldwide. 
This test is mainly conducted on variable δ. Should this variable be greater than zero i.e., δ >
0, the variables need to be differenced. This means that if variables suffer from random 
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shock, it will not die away but will gradually increase over time, rendering the series open to 
the possibility of overestimating figures.  
The second scenario is when variable 𝛿 is equal to zero, i.e., 𝛿 = 0. This is an undesirable 
property because it means that, should the variables suffer from external shock, this shock 
will not die away, nor will it grow but it will remain in the system forever (Brooks, 2008). 
Therefore, the data will need to be differenced in order to make it stationary.  
The third case is when δ is less than zero i.e., δ < 0. This is a desirable property. The data 
need not be differenced because it is stationary. This means that if variables suffer from a 
shock, this shock will gradually die and eventually be permanently removed from the system 
(Brooks, 2014). With this kind of data, a true and accurate representation of data is obtained. 
For robustness check, the study utilized the Phillips-Perron (PP) test of stationarity. This test 
uses a nonparametric statistical method to control for serial correlation in the error terms 
without adding lagged difference terms (Gujarati and Porter, 2009b). 
3.3.1 (B) Engle-Granger’s two-step procedure 
 
Among several tests of co-integration that can be estimated, the Engle-Granger’s two-step 
procedure is used to further confirm and pinpoint where the co-integration lies. This model 
was formulated by Engle and Granger in 1987. It holds power and added advantage because 
it is deemed the most intuitive model which is easy to perform (Sjö, 2008). However, like any 
other financial and statistical model, this test has its own shortfalls. Therefore, other co-
integration methodologies were created and utilized (Sjö, 2008). There are newer models that 
test for co-integration, one of which is the Johansen test. This test also has advantages and 
disadvantages. There is an unresolved debate on which model performs the best when a 
different time span and frequency are used. One of the major drawbacks of this model is that 
it has lower power when dealing with a restricted short sample (Zhou, 2001). Circumventing 
the lower test power of the Johansen test of co-integration for a restricted data sample, and 
given that the data sample for this study is restricted this study employed the Engle-Granger 
test of co-integration despite it being an older model. Regardless of recent innovations and 
additions to financial data models, the Engle-Granger test of co-integration is used quite often 
in the literature when the researcher is faced with a limited data sample (for example, Alam 
(2011); Aktaş and Yilmaz (2012); Asche et al. (2012);  Subha and Nambi (2013); and Yüksel 
and Güleryüz (2015)). 
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High frequency data was used after Zhou (2001) advocated that for a short time span, 
modelling and test power could be compensated for by increasing data frequency. In this 
study daily data was used to boost the test power of the co-integration methodology since the 
study period was restricted. It is noted that increasing the sample span offers more gains in 
testing power than increasing data frequency. One of the ways to increase the time span for 
the models is to implement a roll-over strategy. However, this strategy could not be 
implemented in this study as it sought to compare co-integration relationships between 
indices and asset allocation at the same time. Therefore, implementing a roll-over strategy 
would cause co-integration relationships to be influenced by old observations, and 
subsequently make the co-integration results incomparable to asset allocation since asset 
allocation analysis is only conducted on segregated periods. It is for this reason that asset 
allocation and co-integration data input were divided into different terms to allow for 
comparison within fixed periods of time.  
The Engle-Granger model can be represented using the following equation: 
𝑥1,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑥2,𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑝,𝑡 +  𝑢𝑡                                                                                              𝐸𝑄 3 
In the above equation, p is the number of variables in the equation. The model stresses that all 
variables included be integrated to the same order, i.e., integrated in first order, which means 
that the original data was stationary after being differenced once I(1) or I(2). The residual 
term of this equation is represented in the following equation: 
 𝑢𝑡 =  𝑥1,𝑡 − 𝛽1 − 𝛽2𝑥2,𝑡 − ⋯ − 𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑝,𝑡                                                                                        𝐸𝑄 4  
The term 𝑢𝑡 is the residuals of variables included in the equation denoted by p. The model 
assumes that all variables included in the equation are I(1). 
Usually, this equation represents economically meaningful equations or any understandable 
equation that can be interpreted with ease (Sjö, 2008). If the variables in question are co-
integrated, they will share a common long-run trend and form a stationary relationship in the 
long-run (Sjö, 2008, Gujarati and Porter, 2009a, Brooks, 2014).  
The second step of the Engle-Granger two-step model is to test for unit root on the residuals 
obtained from the first step. ADF is again used to serve this purpose. The ADF test follows 
the same equation used above in the unit root methodology. 
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The estimated residuals will be of the same order as the variables used in step one. Moreover, 
the lag length must be estimated with caution since it is mandatory for the residual process to 
be a white noise process. The null hypothesis is no co-integration. Should the null hypothesis 
be rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis, this will lead to the conclusion that the 
variables are co-integrated and trend together in the long-run. Unlike the normal ADF test for 
variable stationarity, it is important to note that, with this model, co-integration leads to a 
stationary I(0) residual (Sjö, 2008, Brooks, 2014). 
As stated above, this model suffers from some shortfalls. Firstly, the second step of the model 
involves testing stationarity using the ADF model. Therefore, all the problems associated 
with the ADF test are inherited in this model (Sjö, 2008). Second, the model is constructed on 
the assumption of one co-integrating vector captured by the co-integrating regression. It is, 
therefore, necessary to be alert when adding many variables as this may not change the 
outcome of the test. Third, “if some variables do not belong in the co-integrating vector, OLS 
estimation will simply put its parameters to zero, leaving the error process unchanged” (Sjo, 
2008: 11). To avoid this problem, bivariate testing is recommended (Sjö, 2008). 
Before running any co-integration models, it is of the utmost importance that the properties 
carried by data use are known and adjusted accordingly, if required. Data must be non-
stationary at levels, but becomes stationary when differenced once, i.e., stationary at I(1). 
Furthermore, all variables must be integrated to the same order, i.e., all variables must be 
I(1). 
Due to the latter recommendation, a bivariate test was conducted for each index involved in 
this study against all other indices. By doing this, a clear picture of which indices are co-
integrated or otherwise was obtained. The Engle-Granger two-step procedure is a helpful tool 
in a study of this kind because it gives a clear indication of co-integration, unlike other tests 
which estimate the number of co-integrating vectors and do not specifically pinpoint the co-
integrating vectors or equations (Sjö, 2008).  
The study mainly focuses on funds’ returns and tracking ability of selected funds against long 
run relationship of tracked indices. Therefore, any co-integrating relationship found is 
interpreted as the factor that is decreasing the benefits of diversification from the investors’ 
perspective. In contrast, no co-integration is an advantage and good news for investors. 
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As stated in the data section, the data was broken down into four equal terms each carrying 
+500 observations (refer to Table 3). To test for co-integration, six indices found within the 
South African stock market were used. Subsequently, a complete co-integration test 
consisting of 2 019 observations for the full period of eight years was estimated. This 
provided a holistic view of co-integration between selected indices in an eight-year horizon. 
Furthermore, a co-integration test was run on all different terms to determine how the 
relationship between indices changed over time.  
Finally, to further investigate the trending relationship between the aforementioned indices, 
correlation matrixes were established for the purpose of analysing short-run behaviour. This 
method use returns instead of raw data used for other tests.  To make the results meaningful, 
the following widely accepted thresholds were used. Where the correlation coefficient (r) is 
between  
 0.76  to 1.00  = strong/high  positive relative correlation  
 0.51 to 0.75  = medium/moderate positive correlation 
 0.25 to 0.50  = low/weak positive correlation  
 Under 0.25  =  trivial 
The correlation methodology was conducted on both segregated periods and roll-over 
methods. This methodology was employed to answer the question of short-run relationships 
between selected indices throughout the study period. 
 
3.3.2 Asset class factor model 
 
This study used the Sharpe (1992) factor model to test and answer the question of style drift 
in South African mutual funds. A factor model on each fund was run and checked for 
tracking ability and the possibility of style drift. The 427 weekly observations were broken 
down to form seven different terms, each made up of 61 observations, as shown in Table 1. 
The number of terms (seven) offered a wide enough time frame to scrutinize how each fund 
behaved over time and search for any style drift. Moreover, the asset class factor model 
allowed the researcher to identify if managers controlled for style drift or simply deviated for 
extended periods to capture side returns other than those suggested by the fund mandate 
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(name). The R-squared tests were conducted to confirm the efficiency of the asset class factor 
model in modelling the collected data. 
Generally, the South African stock market indices overlap with some shares found in more 
than one index. For example, the industrials and top 40 indices may contain the same stocks 
depending on the stock’s market capitalization. However, this study did not implement any 
measures to circumvent repetition of shares in different indices. Indices were taken as they 
were and regressed against selected tracking funds as per the mutual funds database. This was 
simply because the study aimed to examine the level of diversification and opportunities from 
the retail unit trust investor’s perspective. When these investors invest their funds, they invest 
in the market as it is where there are share repetitions as, unlike institutional investors, they 
do not impose an investment mandate on fund managers. It is therefore easy for institutional 
investors to control and stop portfolio managers from investing in indices with large repeated 
stocks or stipulate any restrictions. Sadly, retail investors do not have this option. It is 
therefore important to use indices as they are since investors invest in them as they are. The 
study sought to compare like for like. The reconstruction of indices would create a 
completely different, partial or conceptual environment from what retail investors are actually 
exposed to when investing in mutual funds.   
The Sharpe (1992) factor or linear model has been used a number of times in the literature 
and is still recognised as the best model to investigate tracking ability (Arezki et al., 2014). 
Thus, this study borrowed this model to test or check the direction of each fund in order to 
separate them and confirm their ability to follow the proposed mandate, i.e., large cap, small 
cap, resources, value stocks, growth stocks, resources and industrial stocks. After confirming 
which fund responded to which asset class (style), the study further investigated the 
possibility of style drift by examining its tracking ability from the first term, i.e., term 1 
moving  to the last term, i.e., term 7. 
Sharpe (1992) states that asset allocation entails a vast amount of variability in total returns 
on a single investor’s portfolio. This is because a single portfolio consists of many different 
assets and funds which may contain a number of securities. Once portfolio managers are 
certain on which asset class they are going to invest in, it is crucial that they determine the 
rate of exposure of each component to movements in their returns. This is widely accepted as 
explained by “beta”. Beta is used to check for tracking ability. Changes in beta pronounce 
changes in tracking ability and mandate. 
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It is widely accepted in the financial literature that financial data and returns can be 
efficiently modelled using the following equation (Brooks, 2008): 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + µ𝑡                                                                                                                EQ5 
In the above equation, 𝑦𝑡 is the dependent variable, 𝑥𝑡 is the explanatory variable, 𝛽 is the 
coefficient of 𝑥𝑡  and represents the relationship between 𝑥𝑡   and  𝑦𝑡 . 𝛼 is alpha and µ𝑡  
represents residuals. 
Equation 5 is called the population regression function. It is regarded as one of the best 
models for modelling financial data and conveys the true relationship between variables. 
Brooks (2008) also describes this model as a data generating process. The model includes 
variable µ𝑡 which is known as disturbance or error term. This term captured data that was not 
detected by the true regression variables, i.e., 𝑥𝑡  and 𝑦𝑡. 𝛽  symbolises the strength of the 
relationship between the explanatory variable and dependent variable. 
Equation 5 may depict returns on single assets to capture the returns on all asset classes at 
once. Sharpe (1992) formulated the following equation which is an advanced version of 
equation 5 in the sense that it reveals the rate of return that a single asset in a portfolio 
contributes to total returns: 
𝑅?̂? = [𝑏𝑖1𝐹1 + 𝑏𝑖2𝐹2 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑛] + 𝑒𝑖                                                                                                                       EQ 6 
 
In equation 6, 𝑅𝑖 denotes the return on asset 𝑖. F1 to 𝐹𝑛 denote the value of factor 1 to the last 
(n-th) factor, keeping in mind that, in this case, a factor describes an asset class. Therefore, 
one can say that F1 to 𝐹𝑛 represent asset class 1 to asset class n. The right hand side of this 
equation represents the total returns on the portfolio while the left hand side represents the 
returns contributed by every style in that portfolio. 
In this study, the asset class factor model is expressed as the following equation: 
 
𝑅?̂? = [𝑏1𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝑏2𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝑏3𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑝 + 𝑏4𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑎𝑝 + 𝑏5𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 +
 𝑏6𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠]+ 𝑖                                                                                                               EQ 7 
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In the equation above, 𝑏1 represents the relationship between asset 𝑅𝑖 returns and returns on 
the value index. 𝑏2 represents the relationship between asset 𝑅𝑖  returns and returns on the 
growth index. The same is true for large cap moving to the last factor “resources”. 
Wermers (2010) presented a complete method of measuring style drift called “holdings based 
style drift measure”. This method provides a detailed report since it measures style drift to 
any possible dimension. This method is also called the “characteristics based approach”. It 
aims to examine a portfolio manager’s performance by examining the characteristics of 
his/her composite portfolio in relation to the target benchmark (Moore, 2013). These 
characteristics may range from price to earnings ratio, to dividend yield, and market to book 
ratio. Furthermore, it classifies and separates drift that is due to active trading and drift due to 
passive holding strategy. Thus, this model reports on induced or intentional drift and drift that 
is beyond the control of the manager such as that related to passively holding stocks that keep 
changing their characteristics. This method is based on the notion that there are three 
dimensions that a style drift may possibly take: “market capitalization” (relating to small-cap, 
mid-cap, and large-cap style), industry adjusted “book to market” (relating to value and 
growth style), and price momentum (relating to momentum contrarian style). The holdings-
based approach suffers from no constraints or limitations and requires subjective judgment to 
group characteristics in order to define a specific management style (Moore, 2013).  
In contrast to Wermers (2010) portfolio-based methodology, this study employed the asset 
class factor model in equation 7 to test for style drift. It borrowed the factor model as opposed 
to Wermers’ methodology because the return-based model requires less information on the 
composition of the portfolio under examination (Moore, 2013). Furthermore, this method 
requires fewer subjective judgements and is able to be used efficiently in the performance 
measurement. However, the factor model would still enable the detection of the direction of 
the drift. As in Sharpe (1992), multifactor models were used to perform return-based style 
analysis. The returns on the funds were analysed with reference to a set of style-based 
explanatory factors which aimed to explain the maximum amount of deviations in the funds’ 
returns over the analysed period. As demonstrated in Ter Horst et al. (2004), these factors are 
often the returns on several factors or benchmark portfolios, such as value, growth, small cap, 
momentum, country or sector portfolios. In this case, the factors were the aforementioned six 
South African indices found on the JSE. 
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The asset class factor model was run on a constructed terms basis and recorded all betas 
which represent fund sensitivity. After recording betas, a regression of weekly returns for the 
next term was done. This was rolled from the first term of the study period until the very last 
term which sits at 6th October 2014. In so doing, a clear picture was obtained of which funds 
changed direction through shift to a certain style and the corresponding move away from a 
certain style. This is best described as style drift, the propensity of fund managers to change 
from one style to another (Wermers, 2010). Style drift can be investigated better using 
Wermers (2010) “holding based method” and “Microsoft solver computer package”. 
Nevertheless, this study used the return-based measure of style investing. By implementing 
this method, patterns of style investing and style drift from the funds’ past returns over a 
desired period of time were derived (Sharpe, 1992). The factor model was employed in order 
to avoid using many different models when it is possible to deliver relevant and accurate 
results in one run. 
All models, i.e., ADF, co-integration models and the asset class factor model, were 
performed on E-views version 6.  
3.4 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter presented a detailed discussion on the methods used to fulfil the two objectives 
of the study outlined in Chapter 1. The Engle-Granger two-step procedure and the asset class 
factor model were employed to answer the research questions which were also presented in 
Chapter 1. The type of data frequency used was clearly explained, i.e., daily data for the 
Engle-Granger two-step approach and weekly observations for the asset class factor model.  
Both sets of data were obtained for a period of eight years from 2006 to 2014. This period 
also contained observations for 2007 when there was a global financial crisis. Hence, this 
study was expected to deliver interesting results which cover the pre- and post- global 
financial crisis period.  





CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This section presents the results obtained after filtering the data described in the previous 
section into the models identified and explained in Chapter 3. The methods were arranged in 
the following order:  
 ADF unit root test; coupled with PP unit root test for robustness purposes 
 Engle-Granger two-step procedure co-integration test; and 
 asset class factor model. 
Each model was run separately and the results were tabulated in the custom tables which are 
displayed in this section for ease reference. The original tables obtained from E-views version 
6 are provided in Appendices B and C.  
4.2 Co-integration results 
 
To test for co-integration, the unit root test was conducted to establish whether each series is 
integrated of I(0) or I(1). As described in Chapter 3, if a series is integrated of I(0), the series 
is stationary at level. However if a series is integrated of I(1), the series is stationary after 
being differenced once. 
4.2.1 Unit root test  
 
Table 6 below shows a summary of the results obtained in the ADF test. The full results 
obtained from E-views are included in Appendix B. The null hypothesis is that each variable 
is non-stationary and the alternative hypothesis is that variable is stationary. The test was 
conducted for the eight-year sample, using daily data, as described in Chapter 3. The total 
number of observations amounted to 2 019. The ADF test enabled intercept and trend to be 






Table 6: ADF Unit root results 
UNIT ROOT  LEVEL   1st DIFFERENCE  









Large cap 0.7145 -3.4120 -1.7796 fail to reject 0.0000 -3.4120 -44.6791    reject 
Small cap 0.9937 -3.4120 -0.1670 fail to reject 0.0000 -3.4120 -37.7999    reject 
Resources 0.1556 -3.4120 -2.9219 fail to reject 0.0000 -3.4120 -42.7059    reject 
Value 0.6302 -3.4120 -1.9449 fail to reject 0.0000 -3.4120 -44.3961    reject 
Growth 0.7772 -3.4120 -1.6394 fail to reject 0.0000 -3.4120 -43.9120    reject 
Industrials 0.8757 -3.4120 -1.3467 fail to reject 0.0000 -3.4120 -44.3940    reject 
 
* MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
 
CRIT VALUE= critical value at 5% level of significance, NH= null hypothesis outcome 
The results show that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at level and hence the variables 
are not stationary at level. Further tests conducted at 1st difference proved otherwise, where 
the null hypothesis was rejected. The tests concluded that all the variables used are stationary 
after being differenced once. The series is therefore, integrated of I(1), suggesting that the 
variables could be co-integrated. The ADF results at levels and first differences of the series 
showed very high p-values and low p-values, respectively, thus implying overwhelming 
support of the data being integrated of order I(1), Nevertheless, the Phillips-Perron (PP) 
stationarity test was conducted for robustness check. This test uses a nonparametric statistical 
method to control for serial correlation in the error terms without adding lagged difference 
terms (Gujarati and Porter, 2009b). Since the asymptotic distribution of the test is the same as 
the ADF test, the PP test therefore shares the same statistical values as the ADF test. The PP 
test further confirms that series are integrated of order I(1). The results from PP output are 









Table 7: Phillips-Perron Unit root results 
UNIT ROOT  LEVEL   1st DIFFERENCE  
 P VALUE   CRIT 
VALUE 
T STAT N H P VALUE  CRIT 
VALUE 
T STAT N H 
Large cap 0.8172 -3.4120 -1.5357 fail to reject 0.0000 -3.4120 -45.1006    reject 
Small cap 0.9807 -3.4120 -0.5594 fail to reject 0.0000 -3.4120 -40.5085    reject 
Resources 0.1593 -3.4120 -2.9101 fail to reject 0.0000 -3.4120 -42.6952    reject 
Value 0.7373 -3.4120 -1.7309 fail to reject 0.0000 -3.4120 -44.6840    reject 
Growth 0.8331 -3.4120 -1.4898 fail to reject 0.0000 -3.4120 -44.0852    reject 
Industrials 0.8772 -3.4120 -1.3410 fail to reject 0.0000 -3.4120 -44.3940    reject 
 
4.2.2 Engle-Granger two-step procedure (long-run relationship) 
 
In this study, all tests were conducted only at the 5% level of significance. This is in line with 
the study by Gallo et al. (2007). This level of significance was selected due to the need for 
precision when investigating funds that are located within the same economy/market as they 
are likely to behave in the same way because they suffer from the same external and internal 
economic shocks. These tests were conducted using daily frequency which was further 
divided into four equal parts, each covering a two-year period. This was done to enable the 
study to capture continuous behaviour and long-run relationships between selected indices. 
The stationarity tests found that all variables are non-stationary at level but become stationary 
at 1st difference. Therefore, they are all integrated to the same order, i.e., I(1), and the Engle-
Granger two-step procedure was performed. 
The results of the bivariate Engle-Granger procedure are summarised in Table 8. Panel A 
tabulates results for the first two years. Panels B to D tabulate results for the second two years 
to fourth two years, respectively, and panel E tabulates results for the overall period of eight 
years. The null hypothesis (N H) is: H(0), variable are I(1) or no co-integration. H(1), 




Table 8: Bivariate/Engle-Granger two-step approach results (segregated period)  
 Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D Panel E 
 FIRST 2 YEARS SECOND 2 YEARS THIRD 2 YEARS FOURTH 2 YEARS 8 YEAR PERIOD 
 
SERIES TESTED        T STAT     N H OUTCOME       T STAT  N H OUTCOME         T STAT N H OUTCOME         T STAT   N H OUTCOME        T STAT  N H OUTCOME 
Small cap/industrials -3.7279 Reject -4.6972 Rejected -4.7727 rejected -2.8947 fail to reject -4.4339 rejected 
Small cap/resources -1.6217 fail to reject -3.8610 Rejected -2.2274 fail to reject -1.8593 fail to reject -1.1189 fail to reject 
Small cap/large cap -1.4817 fail to reject -4.5430 Rejected -3.8876 rejected -3.0202 fail to reject -4.0088 rejected 
Small cap/growth -1.5270 fail to reject -5.1356 Rejected -4.2001 rejected -3.1359 fail to reject -4.0213 rejected 
Small cap/value -2.0584 fail to reject -3.1643 fail to reject -3.4769 rejected -3.1078 fail to reject -1.9662 fail to reject 
           
Industrials/resources -2.1449 fail to reject -2.8358 fail to reject -2.3324 fail to reject -1.8463 fail to reject -1.5628 fail to reject 
Industrials/large cap -1.9527 fail to reject -2.9276 fail to reject -2.5050 fail to reject -2.0042 fail to reject -3.0111 fail to reject 
Industrials/growth -2.1005 fail to reject -3.4517 Rejected -2.8390 fail to reject -2.1382 fail to reject -3.2874 fail to reject 
Industrials/value -1.7351 fail to reject -2.7804 fail to reject -2.0172 fail to reject -1.8619 fail to reject -2.1821 fail to reject 
           
Resources/large cap -2.7150 fail to reject -3.4924 Rejected -3.3340 fail to reject -1.7318 fail to reject -3.1964 fail to reject 
Resources/growth -2.5459 fail to reject -2.4561 fail to reject -3.4025 rejected -1.7090 fail to reject -2.9184 fail to reject 
Resources/value -2.3221 fail to reject -4.0501 Rejected -3.4509 rejected -1.8585 fail to reject -3.2190 fail to reject 
           
Large cap/growth -3.1429 fail to reject -3.3258 fail to reject -2.3962 fail to reject -4.3593 rejected -3.1156 fail to reject 
Large cap/value -2.0036 fail to reject -4.2784 Rejected -2.7287 fail to reject -3.1792 fail to reject -1.8759 fail to reject 
           
Growth/value -2.7326 fail to reject -4.0211 Rejected -1.7469 fail to reject -3.5362 rejected -2.0540 fail to reject 
Engle and Yoo (1987), *EG Critical value 5%= -3.37, EG Critical value at 10%= -3.02 
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The Engle-Granger results for the first two years, which run from 08-SEP-2006 to 05-SEP-
2008, show that there is only one co-integrating equation running between small caps and 
industrials, as shown in panel A. Using a bivariate Engle-Granger two-step procedure, a 
significant relationship with a T- value of -3.7279 was obtained. This value confirms that 
these two indices are co-integrated at the 5% level of significance.  
Moving on to the second term, which runs from 08-SEP-2008 to 07-SEP-2010, the same 
procedure of using daily data for the period of two years was implemented. These results 
show a drastic change compared to the results of the first two years. Here, there were a total 
of nine co-integrating relationships, as shown in panel B, compared to one obtained in the 
previous term. The following indices were found to be co-integrated at the 5% level of 
significance: 
 small caps and industrials;  
 small caps and resources;  
 small cap and large cap; 
 small cap and growth;  
 industrials and growth; 
 resources and large caps; 
 resources and value; 
 large caps and value; and 
 growth and value.  
Of all the reported co-integrating relationships, it is worth noting that the repeat of the long-
run relationship between small caps and industrials was also significant in the first two years. 
These results show that the South African funds industry is very fragile and susceptible to 
drastic changes in a period of less than two years. This proves to be the more unsecured 
timeframe of investing within the funds industry or between selected indices. This horizon 
saw only six non co-integrated combinations out of a possible 15.  
The third two-year period from 08-SEP-2010 to 07-AUG-2010 shows a huge improvement in 
the diversification level and strategies of diversification that can be implemented and 
attained. This term recorded six co-integrating relationships compared to nine in the previous 
term. Notably, the relationship between small caps and industrials still holds. This 
relationship ran from the first to the third term. Small caps and value previously reported a 
non-co-integrated relationship; however, they proved to be co-integrated in the third term. 
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These two indices were also not co-integrated in the first term. Again, this serves as evidence 
of how this industry is subject to change. What was not co-integrated two years ago may be 
perfectly co-integrated in the following year.  
The last term, the fourth two years which sits in the time frame when this study was 
conducted, delivered another unexpected result. This term, which runs from 08-SEP-2012 to 
06-OCT-2014, recorded only two co-integrated relationships lying between: 
 large cap and growth, which becomes co-integrated for the first time in this study; 
and 
 growth and value which become co-integrated for the second time in the space of 
eight years.  
At the beginning of this study, it was expected that growth and value would not as they are be 
co-integrated as they are considered “style and twin”. However, the results show that the 
relationship between these two indices keeps changing from being not co-integrated, which is 
desirable, to co-integrated, and not co-integrated again to co-integrated. Since they started to 
be co-integrated during the second term, were unrelated in the third term and were co-
integrated again in the last term, the eight-year period was examined to establish whether 
these indices still have a long-run relationship. The results show that they are not co-
integrated with a T- value of -2.0540. Having said this, it is important to consult the shortened 
sample before making any judgement and creating a portfolio.  
By breaking the data into short periods of as little as two years but wide enough to satisfy the 
requirements of observations in the models, a clear picture of the fragility and instability of 
this industry was obtained. If long-run relationship was tested using the eight-year period data 
only, the study would have missed how these indices kept changing relationships between 
each other. The results for the entire eight-year period reported only three co-integrated 
relationships which were found between:  
 Small caps and industrials; 
 Small caps and large caps; and 
 Small caps and growth.  
The results obtained from the eight-year period term confirm the overall outcome of the 
study. A repeated co-integrated relationship between small caps and industrials, small caps 
and large caps and small caps and growth was observed i.e. (Panel B and C) and their co-
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integrating relationships were further confirmed in the eight-year period sample, which 
averages all other terms (Panel E).  
4.2.3 Short-run relationship  
 
For the purpose of evaluating short-run relationships between the selected sectorial indices, 
the tables in appendix D, 7.4.1 tabulate correlation coefficients and p-values for all six 
selected South African indices. The results show that, during the first two-year period, all 
indices were correlated and most correlation coefficients were extremely high, substantiating 
near directly proportional relationship. The possible explanation could be that these indices 
share a large amount of the same stocks or they operate within the same economy which 
subjects them to the same economic or financial shocks. Notably, the short-run relationship 
between small cap and resources was low (0.469743) but positive and significant with a p-
value of 0.0000. Also in this term, correlation coefficient for resources and industrials 
recorded a low value of 0.478557. The second two-year term recorded high correlation 
between all indices. Recall that this term also recorded the highest number of co-integrated 
indices from the segregated long-run relationship analysis above. Such strong long-run and 
short-run relationships can be attributed to the fact that this term contains observations from a 
global recessionary term. The lowest correlation coefficient (0.469743) was between small 
cap and resources.  
The third two-year period also recorded high correlations between the six selected funds; 
however, correlation coefficients were weaker than in the previous term. This time frame also 
saw low correlation between small cap and resources. Small cap and resources and industrials 
recorded a significant value of (0.472932), small cap and growth recorded a value of 
(0.489969) and finally, small cap and large cap stated a value of (0.486889). During the 
fourth two-year and the eight-year overall period, the short-run relationship between the six 
selected South African indices strengthened; however, the four previously low correlated 
sets, i.e., (resources/industrials), (small cap/resources) continued to recorded low but positive 
correlation coefficients. 
Given that these indices operate within the same economy, it is no surprise to witness high 
correlation between them. Looking at short-run relationships from the beginning of the data 
sample, the first two years, to the overall period, some indices sets prove to be less correlated. 
These sets are: (resources and industrials), (resources and small cap) and (resources and 
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value). Using short-run relationships to allocate assets, one would then be advised to allocate 
across these less-related indices in order to realise the benefits of diversification. However, 
this method suffers from the many shortcomings mentioned above, and one cannot merely 
rely on short-run results to make long-run decisions.  
4.2.4 Long-run relationship (roll-over strategy) 
 
Table 9 below displays the co-integration relationship results between the selected six JSE 
indices when the roll-over method was used. It is noticeable that, the values in Table 8 differ 
from those in Table 9 because of the difference in the number of observations since the latter 
implements the roll-over strategy. This strategy was used to increase the number of 
observations in a single cycle since co-integration is a long-run phenomenon and also to gain 
better insight into how these indices were linear or continuously related.  
Comparing the results in Tables 8 and 9, we find that, by adding observations through the 
roll-over strategy, the co-integration relationship changes drastically. T- values from panel B 
of Table 8 are closer to the significant region, while T- values from panel B of Table 9 are far 
from being significant at 5% level of confidence interval. This is because panel B of Table 9 
contains diluted observations from pre- and mid-recessionary period observations. As 
suggested above, the high rate of co-integration in the second two years is due to observations 
which only came from the recessionary period, when indices are subjected to the same 
economic turmoil, pressure and difficulties.  
Table 9 below shows that large cap/growth share a weak relationship which is only 
significant at 10% in all cycle. The study conducted and accepted hypothesis testing at 5% 
level of confidence only, but the strengthening relationship between these two indices was 
noted. Small cap/ industrials are consistently co-integrated throughout the study period. 
Moreover, the relationship intensifies as time goes by; T- values increase from the first cycle 
to the third cycle. These findings are comparable with those recorded when the segregation 
strategy was implemented, where this pair was co-integrated four times out of five at 10% 
confidence interval.  Industrials/ growth T- values also strengthens until they reached -
3.2874, which is only significant at 10% but not at 5% confidence interval. Despite the fact 
that we do not regard these two indices as co-integrated since we only accept at 5% 
confidence interval, it is noted that the relationship is becoming stronger over time. Thus, this 
59 
 
pair should perhaps be observed carefully as they promise to converge closer to each other. 
This pair behaves like small cap/growth and small cap/ value pairs. 
The results from both the segregated and roll-over methods recorded a co-integrating 
relationship between small caps and industrials and the relationship is strong as shown by 
largely significant T- value of -4.4339. Interestingly, T- values of (small cap/large cap) and 
(small cap / growth) pairs decrease over time and finally settle by being co-integrated in the 
eight-year period results. 
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Table 9: Engle-Granger two step approach results (Rollover) 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D  
 FIRST CYCLE SECOND CYCLE THIRD CYCLE  8 YEAR PERIOD  
SERIES TESTED T STAT  N H OUTCOME       T STAT N H OUTCOME        T STAT N H OUTCOME  T STAT N H OUTCOME 
Small cap/industrials -3.7279 rejected -4.4989 rejected -4.6498 rejected -4.4339 rejected 
Small cap/resources -1.6217 fail to reject -1.5490 Fail to reject -1.0094 fail to reject -1.1189 fail to reject 
Small cap/large cap -1.4817 fail to reject -2.3718 Fail to reject -2.9713 fail to reject -4.0088 rejected 
Small cap/growth -1.5270 fail to reject -2.1756 fail to reject -3.0215 fail to reject -4.0213 rejected 
Small cap/value -2.0584 fail to reject -2.7935 fail to reject -2.4813 fail to reject -1.9662 fail to reject 
         
Industrials/resources -2.1449 fail to reject -2.1315 fail to reject -1.1339 fail to reject -1.5628 fail to reject 
Industrials/large cap -1.9527 fail to reject -2.4572 fail to reject -2.1714 fail to reject -3.0111 fail to reject 
Industrials/growth -2.1005 fail to reject -2.3316 fail to reject -2.5998 fail to reject -3.2874 fail to reject 
Industrials/value -1.7351 fail to reject -3.1291 fail to reject -1.6574 fail to reject -2.1821 fail to reject 
         
Resources/large cap -2.7150 fail to reject -1.6712 fail to reject -2.0013 fail to reject -3.1964 fail to reject 
Resources/growth -2.5459 fail to reject -2.5530 fail to reject -1.3423 fail to reject -2.9184 fail to reject 
Resources/value -2.3221 fail to reject -1.7243 fail to reject -2.6664 fail to reject -3.2190 fail to reject 
         
Large cap/growth -3.1429 fail to reject -3.0231 fail to reject -3.2666 fail to reject -3.1156 fail to reject 
Large cap/value -2.0036 fail to reject -1.6712 fail to reject -2.6845 fail to reject -1.8759 fail to reject 
         
Growth/value -2.7326 fail to reject -2.1169 fail to reject -2.7736 fail to reject -2.0540 fail to reject 
Engle and Yoo (1987) *EG Critical value 5%= -3.37, EG Critical value at 10%= -3.02 
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The tables in Appendix D, 7.4.2 tabulate correlation coefficients for the roll-over strategy 
which are not much different from those of the segregated period since the first and last term 
have the same coefficient. Notably, when the roll-over strategy is used, the correlation 
coefficients are lower. Evidence of this occurrence is provided by comparing the “second 2 
years” which was obtained using the segregated period method, and the “2nd cycle” which 
was obtained using the roll-over strategy. One possible reason for this is that, the coefficients 
belong to recessionary times, but when the roll-over strategy is implemented, the correlations 
of the recessionary period are diluted with correlations where indices behave in different 
ways and are technically not related. All the correlation coefficients for the segregated period 
are high but with the roll-over strategy, the following correlation coefficients lie in the 
medium threshold bracket as discussed in the methodology section: 
 resources and industrials (medium) 
 resources and small cap (medium) 
The same is true for roll-over of the “3rd cycle” correlation coefficients. In this term, the 
short-run relationship between resources and industrials went from medium to low, while, on 
the other side, resources and large cap reduced from high to medium. The following short-run 
relationships from “3rd cycle” were found to lie in the low and medium brackets: 
 Resources and industrials (low) 
 Resources and large cap (medium) 
 Resources and small cap (medium) 
 Resources and value (medium).  
The 1st term and overall period were not interpreted for the roll-over strategy because the 
results are the same for both the roll-over and segregated period methods. Interestingly, the 
results from both methods reveal that the resources indices are not correlated to many indices 
in the short-run. However this was also the case from the long-run relationship tests. 
Interpreting these findings from the perspective of a risk adverse investor, it would be 
advisable to choose a combination of indices that includes resources.  
4.3 Style drift (Asset class factor model) 
 
The results for the style drift objective were obtained through the execution of the Sharpe 
asset class factor model.  Sharpe (1992) provides that, for efficient results, 61 observations 
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are necessary and optimal. Consequently, the data was separated into seven terms, each 
containing 61 weekly observations. The results in Table 10 below show how each fund 
responded to returns of its style/index and other South African sector indices. One of the 
primary assumptions used for this objective was that, if funds truly replicate their indices, the 
behaviour of the fund alone must be related to the behaviour of its parent index (benchmark). 
This study acknowledges that there will not be a one-on-one relationship between fund and 
index because an index is made up of many stocks, but there should be a notably positive and 
significant relationship. The following tables (10-33) display the results for all six indices 
used in this study against 34 funds.  
Values in BOLD are significant at the 5% level of significance. Values in BOLD are non-
significant at the 5% level where they are expected to be significant because they are 
purported to replicate their index. 
4.3.1 Small caps results and tables  
 
Table 10: Small cap Fund A; factor model results 
SMALLCAPS      term 1   term 2    term 3     term 4    term 5    term 6    term 7  














 Beta  -2.5345 -0.7929 -0.8479 -4.1748 -5.1819 -1.1747 -0.6062 
Large cap p value  0.0013 0.2579 0.3161 0.0011 0.0003 0.1306 0.3963 
           Beta  0.2882 0.5398 0.3627 0.1166 -0.1416 0.4567 0.227 
SMALLCAP  P VALUE  0.0197 0.0002 0.0009 0.4821 0.4433 0.0004 0.0513 
          
 Beta  0.1611 0.2856 -0.3346 0.0116 0.0041 -0.1918 -0.1406 
Resources p value  0.0641 0.0352 0.0002 0.9317 0.9738 0.0056 0.012 
          
 Beta  1.5245 0.3408 0.6836 2.3398 2.9545 0.5178 0.2553 
Value p value  0.0011 0.4378 0.1693 0.0013 0.0002 0.0908 0.3421 
          
 Beta  1.3299 0.1725 0.7996 2.602 3.2031 1.3207 0.9134 
Growth  p value  0.0022 0.6023 0.1036 0.0002 0.0001 0.0235 0.1006 
          
 Beta  0.1520 0.4089 0.2032 -0.0645 0.0709 0.0113 0.1590 







Table 11: Small cap FUND B; factor model results  
SMALLCAP  term 1 term 2 term 3 term 4 term 5 term 6 term 7 














 Beta  -1.3682 -0.8342 -2.3134 -3.585 -2.0622 -0.6177 -1.2066 
Large cap  p value  0.1064 0.1432 0.014 0.0005 0.0516 0.3390 0.1320 
          
 Beta  0.5043 0.6067 0.5191 0.1738 0.4533 0.2336 0.2717 
SMALLCAP P VALUE  0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.1926 0.0024 0.0472 0.0366 
          
 Beta  -0.1275 0.0917 -0.2015 0.079 0.0294 -0.0052 0.003 
Resources p value  0.1854 0.3953 0.0292 0.467 0.7667 0.9345 0.9594 
          
 Beta  0.8054 0.4332 1.5645 1.9727 1.0595 0.3586 0.2378 
Value p value  0.1083 0.2252 0.0049 0.0008 0.0708 0.2145 0.4260 
          
 Beta  1.0334 0.3471 1.4877 2.1807 1.2279 0.6819 1.1949 
Growth p value  0.0288 0.1985 0.0064 0.0001 0.0411 0.2103 0.0547 
          
 Beta  0.0829 0.2766 -0.0712 0.0036 0.1542 -0.0370 0.4091 
Industrials p value  0.3597 0.0024 0.5667 0.9731 0.1465 0.6767 0.0005 
 
 
Table 12: Small cap FUND C; factor model results  
SMALLCAP   Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  -0.5894 0.3483 3.4313 1.003 -3.7996 -1.7987 -3.4608 
Large cap p value  0.7132 0.6947 0.0695 0.4797 0.0005 0.0164 0.0136 
          
 Beta  0.7526 0.7658 1.0612 0.6285 0.3971 0.4611 0.2839 
SMALL CAP P VALUE  0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0014 0.0062 0.0003 0.1716 
          
 Beta  0.0242 0.3394 -0.3368 -0.2547 0.0545 0.0598 0.1294 
Resources p value  0.8376 0.0255 0.0898 0.1651 0.5389 0.4149 0.1806 
          
 Beta  0.3152 -0.4549 -1.9082 -0.7514 2.1897 0.7458 0.8065 
Value p value  0.7037 0.4564 0.0811 0.3626 0.0004 0.0214 0.1096 
          
 Beta  0.4562 -0.4023 -1.7727 -0.0416 2.1844 1.4934 2.8343 
Growth p value  0.6406 0.3489 0.0931 0.9564 0.0006 0.0059 0.0098 
          
 Beta  0.0631 0.3875 0.4118 0.1609 -0.169 -0.1149 0.2764 







Table 13: Small cap FUND D; factor model results  
 
SMALL CAP     term 1   term 2   term 3   term 4   term 5   term 6   term 7 














 Beta  -2.5467 -0.9986 -2.9757 -0.0014 -1.3224 -0.2457 -0.9690 
Large cap p value  0.0135 0.1525 0.0162 0.9988 0.2779 0.6981 0.1860 
          
 Beta  0.3555 0.6728 0.6610 0.5785 0.4929 0.3429 0.3894 
SMALL CAP P VALUE  0.0305 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0044 0.0011 0.0015 
          
 Beta  0.0478 -0.0667 -0.4529 0.0045 -0.0137 0.0555 -0.0088 
Resources p value  0.6757 0.6132 0.0003 0.9683 0.9050 0.3153 0.8734 
          
 Beta  1.4468 0.7891 1.8693 0.1131 0.8664 0.1850 0.4001 
Value p value  0.0175 0.0738 0.1032 0.8457 0.201 0.4582 0.1468 
          
 Beta  1.4359 0.4512 2.1339 -0.1156 0.7032 0.2514 0.9106 
Growth p value  0.0117 0.1730 0.0032 0.8348 0.3080 0.5921 0.1085 
          
 Beta  0.1154 0.0642 -0.2318 0.0823 0.0722 -0.0263 0.0258 
Industrials p value  0.2873 0.5484 0.1604 0.4699 0.5557 0.7326 0.7997 
 
Tables 10-13 above display the results obtained from the Sharpe (1992) asset class factor 
model. This model was rolled out from the beginning of the period covered in this study to 
the end. Betas and p-values were used to determine the relationship between each fund and 
selected indices which were used as factors. The top funds in the sample of small cap funds 
followed the mandate suggested by the name of the style. They are shown by the values of 
beta and level of significance. The relationship between small cap mutual funds and the small 
cap index is positive and significant in most cases. There are only four cases where these 
small cap funds were unresponsive to changes in the small cap index. The relationship 
between these two funds and the other indices is significant, especially to resources, value 
and growth. Notably, a pattern is found that, when these funds prove unresponsive to changes 
in small cap indices, they become more responsive to value and growth, but this is short-
lived.  
During terms four and five, FUND A in Table 10 was not tracking its own index. However, it 
tracked the value index with beta of 2.3398 in term four and 2.9545 in term five. This 
tracking ability proved valid and significant with p-values of 0.0013 and 0.0002 in term four 
and five, respectively. 
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In the same terms, i.e., four and five, the same fund also became more responsive to returns 
of the growth index with tracking ability of 2.6020 in term four and 3.2031 in term five. The 
relationship was pronounced valid and significant by p-values of 0.0002 and 0.001, 
respectively. From the values provided by beta and p-values, the findings show that the 
relationship became stronger as the investigation moved from term four to term five. The 
tracking ability grew stronger while the p-value showed that the relationship was becoming 
more significant. In term six, the relationship between FUND A and the value index was 
terminated. Meanwhile, it remained positive with the growth index but beta was less and the 
p-value proved that the relationship was fading away but was still significant. The 
relationship became statistically insignificant in term seven. 
FUND B, in Table 11, displayed almost the same tracking ability as FUND A except that this 
fund started tracking growth and value indices in terms three to four, finally cutting off the 
relationship with value in term five while the relationship was cut off in term six for growth 
index. Just like FUND A, FUND B increased the tracking ability and significance level with 
values amounting to beta = 1.4877, p-value 0.0064 in term three. During term four, these 
values increased to beta = 2.1807, p-value 0.001. The results show that these funds behaved 
in a very similar way except that FUND A was lagged once to FUND B. 
FUNDS C and B, which were found to be bottom performers when the data was collected, 
also showed valid and significant responses to the value and growth indices. FUND C shared 
a significant relationship with the value index twice while the relationship with the growth 
index was shown three times. FUND D was resilient in tracking its own index. The bottom-
performing funds proved to be more consistent in replicating their own index than the top two 
funds, but it is clear that small cap funds had a drift in both value and growth indices. The 
tracking and drifting pattern was the same; the difference was in timing as some funds 
became significant a little bit later than other funds in the same group.  
4.3.2 Large caps results 
 
Tables 14-17 record the results for large caps. All the funds in the sample of large caps 
behaved in the same way and proved to not be responsive to the returns of their own index. 
FUNDS A and B became responsive only once in seven terms while FUNDS C and D 
responded twice. These results are unexpected since large caps do not appear to be tracking 
any of the selected local indices. These funds also take the opposite direction to other selected 
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indices as they show a negative beta relationship against their index and many other South 
African indices. This could strengthen evidence that these funds track other indices not 
covered in this study. 
Table 14: Large cap FUND A; factor model results  
 
LARGECAP   Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  -0.2923 -0.0600 -0.9409 1.0948 -1.7325 1.2039 1.6066 
LARGECAP P VALUE  0.7527 0.9259 0.3783 0.2903 0.1984 0.0628 0.004 
          
 Beta  -0.0451 0.0541 -0.0705 -0.1264 -0.4316 0.0585 0.0350 
Small cap p value  0.7618 0.6684 0.5892 0.3711 0.0218 0.5617 0.6850 
          
 Beta  0.1246 0.1447 -0.2658 0.0778 0.1048 -0.0126 -0.0295 
Resources p value  0.2419 0.2427 0.014 0.5006 0.4115 0.8191 0.4726 
          
 Beta  0.6600 0.443 1.1201 -0.2497 1.3309 -0.2019 -0.1452 
Value p value  0.2324 0.2779 0.0765 0.6727 0.077 0.4211 0.4729 
          
 Beta  0.5326 0.4134 1.3261 -0.1489 1.5576 -0.1131 -0.4419 
Growth p value  0.3006 0.1812 0.0342 0.7913 0.0436 0.8104 0.2885 
          
 Beta  -0.0659 0.0392 -0.036 0.2058 0.0473 0.0343 0.0268 
Industrials p value  0.5103 0.6944 0.5073 0.0788 0.7262 0.6576 0.7207 
 
Table 15: Large cap FUND B; factor model results  
LARGE CAP  Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  0.4935 0.6115 -0.397 1.2622 -0.9068 2.5989 0.9911 
LARGECAP P VALUE  0.6362 0.3294 0.7764 0.2715 0.4771 0.0018 0.1453 
          
 Beta  0.124 -0.0352 0.0526 0.0007 -0.3577 0.0762 -0.0127 
Small cap p value  0.4562 0.7729 0.7585 0.9962 0.0446 0.5443 0.9061 
          
 Beta  0.0853 -0.2529 -0.2907 -0.0157 0.0632 0.001 0.0434 
Resources p value  0.4594 0.0373 0.0391 0.9022 0.6020 0.9878 0.3997 
          
 Beta  0.2471 0.0144 0.8279 -0.3541 0.6886 -0.801 -0.0422 
Value p value  0.6890 0.9705 0.3139 0.5890 0.3315 0.0126 0.8675 
          
 Beta  0.0170 0.4509 1.0156 -0.1248 1.1489 -1.1106 -0.0655 
Growth p value  0.9763 0.1323 0.2105 0.8414 0.1151 0.0626 0.8997 
          
 Beta  -0.1179 0.0246 -0.1347 0.1551 0.1568 -0.052 0.0278 




Table 16: Large cap FUND C; factor model results 
 
LARGECAP   Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  0.2394 -0.0445 -2.7823 0.8859 -1.5952 -0.6177 1.4451 
LARGECAP P VALUE  0.8010 0.9481 0.0391 0.3968 0.2357 0.3990 0.0046 
          
 Beta  0.0477 0.0605 -0.0936 -0.0636 -0.401 0.2336 -0.0235 
Small cap p value  0.7544 0.6510 0.5639 0.6555 0.0325 0.0472 0.7653 
          
 Beta  0.1745 0.1426 -0.3490 0.0005 0.0857 -0.0052 0.0056 
Resources p value  0.1114 0.2768 0.0097 0.9964 0.5013 0.9345 0.8793 
          
 Beta  0.2771 0.3486 2.2628 -0.1008 1.244 0.3586 -0.1652 
Value p value  0.6223 0.4190 0.0049 0.8660 0.0975 0.2145 0.3720 
          
 Beta  0.2121 0.453 2.4861 0.0450 1.4591 0.6819 -0.3263 
Growth p value  0.6859 0.1669 0.0018 0.9369 0.0581 0.2103 0.3900 
          
 Beta  -0.0842 0.0498 -0.3808 0.1569 0.1306 -0.0370 0.0812 




Table 17: Large cap FUND D; factor model results  
LARGECAP   Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  0.8926 -0.2155 1.2718 1.3135 -1.6201 1.4026 1.483 
LARGECAP P VALUE  0.3468 0.7450 0.2349 0.2252 0.2611 0.0378 0.0037 
          
 Beta  0.0943 0.0088 0.1204 -0.0413 -0.4536 0.0825 0.0118 
Small cap p value  0.5348 0.9458 0.3575 0.7786 0.0245 0.4321 0.8805 
          
 Beta  0.1161 0.1646 -0.2261 0.0072 0.0933 -0.0224 0.0095 
Resources p value  0.2838 0.1958 0.0351 0.9517 0.4950 0.6971 0.7992 
          
 Beta  0.0181 0.5065 -0.0259 -0.3383 1.2428 -0.2684 -0.1368 
Value p value  0.9742 0.2271 0.9667 0.5839 0.1222 0.3043 0.4589 
          
 Beta  -0.1411 0.4836 -0.0095 -0.2020 1.5025 -0.2552 -0.3715 
Growth p value  0.7867 0.1282 0.9875 0.7311 0.0684 0.6027 0.3283 
          
 Beta  -0.1179 0.0583 -0.0884 0.1857 0.1189 0.0163 0.047 





4.3.3 Industrials results and tables 
 
Tables 18-21 indicate the tracking ability of four sampled industrials mutual funds. This 
sector is made up of stocks such as construction and materials, electronic and electrical 
equipment, industrial engineering, industrial transportation, etc. These funds were created 
with the main objective of replicating these stocks which, in return, constitute the industrial 
index known as FTSE/JSE J520. They are, therefore, expected to perform well if there is a 
boom in this sector. 
 
 
Table 18: Industrials FUND A; factor model results  
INDUSTRIALS  Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  0.1180 -0.6358 -2.5859 -0.7258 -1.5762 1.7189 -0.4416 
Large cap p value  0.0181 0.3004 0.0081 0.4782 0.2103 0.0081 0.5356 
          
 Beta  -2.2794 0.2648 0.0503 -0.0409 0.1041 0.2247 -0.0060 
Small cap p value  0.2742 0.0300 0.6639 0.7695 0.5445 0.0271 0.9580 
          
 Beta  -0.1617 -0.3123 -0.7491 0.4961 -0.3968 -0.2751 -0.1748 
Resources p value  0.1352 0.0094 0.0000 0.0001 0.0015 0.0000 0.0021 
          
 Beta  1.5939 0.7646 2.1333 0.8026 1.4283 -0.4246 0.2881 
Value Significance  0.0057 0.0506 0.0003 0.1741 0.0432 0.0894 0.2839 
          
 Beta  1.4231 0.5688 2.3082 1.1057 1.3917 -0.6345 1.0627 
Growth p value  0.0079 0.0540 0.0001 0.0515 0.0532 0.1758 0.0569 
          
 Beta  0.1330 0.3657 -0.1486 0.1146 0.0061 0.1140 0.0883 











Table 19: Industrials FUND B; factor model results 
INDUSTRIALS  Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  -1.5832 -0.1560 -2.7568 -3.1559 -2.0667 -0.4387 -0.1427 
Large cap p value  0.0535 0.7632 0.0303 0.0052 0.0644 0.5460 0.8413 
          
 Beta  0.0784 -0.0039 -0.3240 -0.1693 -0.3122 0.0323 0.0470 
Small cap p value  0.5447 0.9688 0.0374 0.2587 0.0426 0.7782 0.6816 
          
 Beta  -0.0692 -0.2383 -0.4618 -0.2534 -0.3448 -0.2863 -0.3024 
Resources p value  0.4526 0.0186 0.0004 0.0415 0.0017 0.0000 0.0000 
          
 Beta  1.0053 0.3900 1.7441 1.9564 1.5253 0.3743 0.2396 
Value Significance  0.0389 0.2337 0.0197 0.0027 0.0150 0.1927 0.3725 
          
 Beta  1.0487 0.3228 2.0945 2.2695 1.7479 1.0202 0.8173 
Growth p value  0.0215 0.1924 0.0049 0.0003 0.0067 0.0616 0.1409 
          
 Beta  0.4726 0.6002 0.4091 0.2332 0.2152 0.1319 0.2521 




Table 20: Industrials FUND C; factor model results 
INDUSTRIALS  Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  -2.0718 0.3389 -0.7245 0.0251 -2.1695 -0.1670 0.038 
Large cap p value  0.0499 0.6040 0.4339 0.9833 0.0728 0.8081 0.9626 
          
 Beta  0.1228 0.3309 0.4422 0.0005 -0.2706 0.1968 0.0971 
Small cap p value  0.4619 0.0118 0.0002 0.9972 0.1024 0.0748 0.4568 
          
 Beta  -0.3825 -0.2198 -0.463 -0.4389 -0.2541 -0.1805 -0.2668 
Resources p value  0.0020 0.0815 0.0000 0.0018 0.0284 0.0037 0.0001 
          
 Beta  1.5195 -0.1203 0.6792 0.3706 1.5406 0.1658 0.2081 
Value Significance  0.0161 0.7694 0.2123 0.5910 0.0229 0.5402 0.4951 
          
 Beta  1.6471 0.1158 1.0432 0.5532 1.6663 0.6977 0.7635 
Growth p value  0.0056 0.7088 0.0540 0.4008 0.0162 0.1742 0.2248 
          
 Beta  0.0041 0.3805 -0.0836 0.343 0.2335 0.1389 0.0313 






Table 21: Industrials FUND D; factor model results 
INDUSTRIALS    Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  -1.5592 -0.103 -2.7277 -3.1714 -2.2724 -0.4416 -0.2037 
Large cap p value  0.0633 0.8444 0.0415 0.005 0.0508 0.5655 0.7892 
          
 Beta  0.0775 -0.0068 -0.3353 -0.1678 -0.333 0.0416 0.0403 
Small cap p value  0.5591 0.9465 0.0408 0.2625 0.0377 0.7287 0.7419 
          
 Beta  -0.0594 -0.238 -0.4865 -0.2675 -0.3434 -0.2861 -0.3137 
Resources p value  0.5289 0.0204 0.0004 0.0317 0.0025 0.0001 0.0000 
          
 Beta  0.9922 0.3425 1.7396 1.9394 1.6462 0.387 0.2596 
Value P value  0.0464 0.3021 0.0269 0.0029 0.0117 0.2026 0.3661 
          
 Beta  1.0286 0.2964 2.1017 2.3184 1.8679 1.0153 0.8786 
Growth p value  0.0275 0.2376 0.0072 0.0003 0.0054 0.0781 0.1387 
          
 Beta  0.474 0.6162 0.4145 0.2255 0.1928 0.1177 0.246 
INDUSTRIALS P VALUE  0.0000 0.0000 0.0232 0.0688 0.0992 0.2102 0.0241 
 
The results from the industrials funds show one clear strategy implemented by funds in the 
selected data sample. All the funds aimed to replicate both value and growth in more or less 
the same way. FUNDS A and C did not follow the returns of their indices. FUND A became 
significant to its own index only once while FUND C became significant twice. In term two, 
FUNDS B, C and D became significant to the industrials’ index and abandoned the 
relationship with both growth and value indices. This broken relationship was re-instated by 
FUNDS B and D in term three up until term six. 
It is evident that the sampled funds within the industrials index behaved in a similar way. 
Small cap funds shared a similar pattern. The results suggest that the mandate or strategy 
implemented by industrial funds is to track both value and growth stocks with the same ratio 
and fully track the industrial index when both value and growth indices experience hard 
times. Recalling the results obtained in the co-integration test, growth and value stocks were 
co-integrated during the last term of the study, i.e., the fourth two-year term. This term 
matches term seven in the style drift results. During this period, all industrials funds moved 
away from tracking both these indices at the same time. This sends a message that fund 
managers do drift from their promised mandate and they do perform stock picking outside 
their index but they do this with caution and make sure they are consistent with the rules of 
diversification. Investing in two co-integrated styles is the same as putting all one’s eggs in a 
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single basket. Striking evidence found from the funds in the study sample is that they tend to 
go in the opposite direction from resource indices. Several significant p-values that are 
associated with negative betas from the resources index were obtained. However, this does 
not apply only to resource funds. The study found that industrials funds only share positive 
tracking ability with value and growth indices when these two indices are not co-integrated. 
Industrials funds shift away from tracking them as soon as they start to be co-integrated. All 
other indices were found to have a significant negative relationship with industrials funds.  
4.3.4 Resources results and tables  
 
The results obtained for the resources funds in Tables 22-25 show that these funds were the 
most disciplined investments or unit trusts. The top two funds, FUNDS A and B became 
perfectly responsive to their index from the start to the end. FUND A also shared a significant 
relationship with both value and growth indices in term three. FUND D tracked the same 
value and growth indices with high ratios in the same term. During this time, FUND D’s 
returns were not separate and statistically insignificant from the returns of its index. The 
tracking ratio for FUND D was 3.2113 for value and 2.7104 for growth. This fund was not 
responsive to returns of the resources index. This was after FUND C had already cut its 
relationship with the resources index in term two and replicated the value index with a ratio 
of 4.2873 and 2.5139 for growth. Both tracking ratios were significant. 
FUND B became responsive later in term five and the tracking ratio was extremely high, 
marked at 2.0071 for value and 2.1633 for growth.  Both FUNDS C and D fairly replicated 
their index but made little stock picking along the way. The results are consistent with 
previously reported negative relationships between industrials and resources. 
Tables 22-25 identify the results obtained from the sampled resources mutual funds. These 
mutual funds track the performance of firms that constitute this index which is known as 
FTSE/JSE J210. This index is made up of firms that focus on forestry, paper, industrial 







Table 22: Resources FUND A; factor model results 
RESOURCES   Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  -0.3314 -1.2502 -2.9241 1.0677 -1.0129 0.9227 -0.4728 
Large cap p value  0.7635 0.2419 0.0176 0.2848 0.4297 0.3237 0.6139 
           Beta  0.2227 0.1611 0.0889 0.2427 -0.0848 0.0047 0.0311 
Small cap p value  0.2109 0.4385 0.5456 0.0781 0.6295 0.9744 0.8359 
           Beta  0.7247 0.8978 0.6127 0.7111 0.8204 0.6419 0.6828 
RESOURCES P VALUE  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
           Beta  0.4863 0.3868 1.8077 -0.6327 0.2932 -0.2719 0.3488 
Value p value  0.4569 0.5628 0.0124 0.2692 0.6796 0.4584 0.3236 
           Beta  -0.1357 0.5161 1.8980 -0.4993 0.6565 -0.4277 0.5664 
Growth p value  0.8234 0.3082 0.0079 0.3592 0.3666 0.5354 0.4340 
           Beta  -0.0243 0.1605 -0.4632 0.0976 0.2377 0.0132 -0.1169 
Industrials p value  0.8377 0.3297 0.0061 0.3821 0.0701 0.9066 0.3737 
 
 
Table 23: Resources FUND B; factor model results 
RESOURCES   Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  -0.7627 -1.1249 -0.0993 0.0544 -3.8497 1.2239 0.5737 
Large cap p value  0.5449 0.1545 0.9396 0.9673 0.0187 0.2210 0.5942 
          
 Beta  0.0417 -0.0013 0.109 -0.004 -0.4423 0.1254 0.0102 
Small cap p value  0.8363 0.9932 0.4984 0.9821 0.0475 0.4262 0.9525 
          
 Beta  0.827 0.8913 0.3727 0.6699 0.8808 0.7174 0.6503 
RESOURCES P VALUE  0.0000 0.0000 0.0056 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
          
 Beta  0.6422 0.7624 0.3609 0.0125 2.0071 -0.3872 0.0196 
Value p value  0.3901 0.1254 0.6388 0.9869 0.0267 0.3232 0.9613 
          
 Beta  0.1362 0.3252 0.3675 0.0691 2.1633 -0.7616 -0.2955 
Growth p value  0.8445 0.3831 0.6272 0.9241 0.0196 0.2988 0.7217 
          
 Beta  -0.0669 0.0635 -0.1746 0.175 0.1899 -0.018 0.0300 







Table 24: Resources FUND C; factor model results 
RESOURCES   Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  2.5884 -5.8024 -2.8656 0.2591 9.3737 -7.1161 -4.5916 
Large cap p value  0.4397 0.0262 0.2515 0.9203 0.0204 0.0047 0.1381 
          
 Beta  0.7323 0.0726 0.4043 0.2211 0.4669 -0.2888 0.7795 
Small cap p value  0.0825 0.8636 0.2056 0.5198 0.3815 0.4712 0.0965 
          
 Beta  1.1978 0.633 0.9471 0.3838 0.7459 1.2998 1.0762 
RESOURCES P VALUE  0.0000 0.1419 0.0006 0.2515 0.0300 0.0000 0.0000 
          
 Beta  -0.8077 4.2873 0.5291 -0.5594 -5.6732 2.0675 1.5814 
Value p value  0.6402 0.0172 0.7133 0.7101 0.013 0.0533 0.1617 
          
 Beta  -2.9014 2.5139 1.7691 0.2975 -5.4411 5.1124 3.1982 
Growth p value  0.1578 0.0448 0.2065 0.8308 0.0209 0.0047 0.1848 
          
 Beta  -0.1626 -1.303 -0.313 -0.063 0.6057 -0.2432 -0.9761 




Table 25:  Resources FUND D; factor model results 
RESOURCES   Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  -0.4346 0.6496 -4.0618 0.3562 -3.853 0.0649 -0.315 
Large cap p value  0.7319 0.4869 0.0290 0.8164 0.0352 0.9560 0.8185 
          
 Beta  0.0205 0.4118 -0.1068 0.128 -0.3899 0.1616 0.2420 
Small cap p value  0.9194 0.0271 0.6321 0.5423 0.1172 0.3882 0.2752 
          
 Beta  0.6882 0.828 0.0937 0.5756 0.9897 0.928 0.662 
RESOURCES P VALUE  0.0000 0.0000 0.6023 0.0014 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
          
 Beta  0.5661 -0.8113 3.2113 -0.2251 1.6379 -0.1194 0.3144 
Value p value  0.4519 0.1700 0.0038 0.7980 0.1036 0.7967 0.5428 
          
 Beta  0.1328 -0.3569 2.7104 0.0395 2.3201 -0.0836 0.329 
growth p value  0.8495 0.4214 0.0121 0.9623 0.0255 0.9236 0.7561 
          
 Beta  -0.0914 0.3121 -0.4862 -0.0026 0.1967 0.0075 -0.1251 





4.3.5 Growth results and tables   
 
Table 26: Growth FUND A; factor model results 
GROWTH   Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  -1.1465 -1.1657 -3.3096 -2.0048 -2.6009 0.0168 -1.4201 
Largecap p value  0.0945 0.031 0.0023 0.0373 0.0306 0.9795 0.0281 
           Beta  0.1068 0.1885 -0.0093 -0.0337 -0.1539 0.1772 -0.0738 
Small cap p value  0.3273 0.0722 0.9414 0.7934 0.3430 0.0927 0.4681 
           Beta  -0.0542 0.0975 -0.5725 0.0411 0.1203 -0.0849 -0.0539 
Resources p value  0.4833 0.3353 0.0000 0.6968 0.2853 0.1409 0.2660 
           Beta  1.041 0.9261 2.6894 1.3761 1.6004 0.167 0.8348 
Value p value  0.0117 0.0071 0.0000 0.0134 0.017 0.5184 0.0009 
           Beta  0.8736 0.6447 2.451 1.3223 1.7869 0.5509 1.5606 
GROWTH P VALUE  0.0225 0.0126 0.0001 0.0127 0.0094 0.2601 0.0022 
           Beta  0.0538 0.331 -0.0539 0.2269 0.1825 0.1046 0.0557 
Industrials p value  0.4614 0.0002 0.7027 0.0355 0.1289 0.1940 0.5292 
 
Table 27: Growth FUND B; factor model results 
 
GROWTH   Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  0.5939 -0.9869 0.2876 0.571 -1.6707 1.6725 0.5359 
Large cap p value  0.5304 0.1374 0.8642 0.5908 0.2132 0.0337 0.4387 
          
 Beta  0.4436 0.1382 -0.0211 -0.0725 -0.0834 0.1244 0.0357 
Small cap p value  0.0048 0.2844 0.9181 0.6176 0.6489 0.3105 0.7471 
          
 Beta  -0.3411 -0.2497 -0.3475 -0.0528 0.0376 -0.0188 0.041 
Resources p value  0.0024 0.0504 0.0403 0.6566 0.7670 0.7792 0.4371 
          
 Beta  0.4090 1.1426 0.4711 0.1217 1.2670 -0.2600 0.1969 
Value p value  0.4658 0.0075 0.6326 0.8414 0.0908 0.3924 0.4488 
          
 Beta  -0.0196 0.8569 0.234 -0.0342 1.2852 -0.7104 0.0896 
GROWTH P VALUE  0.9699 0.0079 0.8092 0.9529 0.0928 0.2165 0.8663 
          
 Beta  -0.0039 0.115 0.2125 0.2667 0.0991 -0.0255 0.0274 






Table 28: Growth FUND C; factor model results 
GROWTH   Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  -0.6099 -0.0496 -5.004 1.183 -1.7515 -0.4341 -0.2184 
Large cap p value  0.4922 0.9253 0.0003 0.2159 0.1080 0.6414 0.7582 
          
 Beta  0.0792 0.0791 -0.0486 0.0442 0.0159 0.1931 0.1467 
Small cap p value  0.5781 0.4464 0.7619 0.7331 0.9140 0.1937 0.2015 
          
 Beta  -0.1339 0.1610 -0.5582 -0.1333 0.0878 0.1453 -0.0233 
Resources p value  0.1889 0.1153 0.0001 0.2127 0.3933 0.0769 0.6665 
          
 Beta  1.1066 0.3432 3.3686 -0.2226 1.1971 0.2975 0.2914 
Value p value  0.0387 0.3056 0.0000 0.6827 0.0490 0.4176 0.2768 
          
 Beta  0.5728 0.0644 3.9457 -0.1524 1.3498 0.6426 0.6965 
GROWTH P VALUE  0.2445 0.7979 0.0000 0.7689 0.0304 0.3531 0.2064 
          
 Beta  0.0185 0.3899 -0.5810 0.2330 0.1554 0.0482 0.0217 
Industrials p value  0.8457 0.0000 0.0018 0.0321 0.1568 0.6705 0.8265 
 
Table 29:  Growth FUND D; factor model results 
 
GROWTH   Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  0.0045 0.7728 1.0805 0.5848 -1.1281 0.6846 -0.772 
Large cap p value  0.9948 0.1503 0.2580 0.5736 0.3538 0.3150 0.2412 
           Beta  0.2006 0.3720 0.3426 0.1907 -0.0097 0.2256 -0.0065 
Small cap p value  0.0804 0.0007 0.0046 0.1826 0.9535 0.0394 0.9507 
          
 Beta  -0.1139 -0.1832 -0.3024 -0.0497 0.0181 0.0717 -0.0092 
Resources p value  0.1604 0.0752 0.0021 0.6690 0.8750 0.2271 0.8525 
          
 Beta  0.4090 -0.0030 1.12E -0.1505 0.8563 -0.0100 0.4773 
Value p value  0.3290 0.9928 1.0000 0.8003 0.2061 0.9699 0.0564 
          
 Beta  0.2387 -0.0187 -0.2761 -0.0145 0.8537 -0.269 1.0052 
GROWTH P VALUE  0.5401 0.9409 0.6143 0.9796 0.2168 0.5924 0.0505 
          
 Beta  0.0451 0.0918 0.1188 0.1178 0.1125 -0.1122 0.0009 
Industrials p value  0.5532 0.2666 0.3587 0.3132 0.3597 0.1773 0.9199 
 
From the sample of growth funds used, no pattern can be identified. Of the sample, with two 
top performers and two bottom performers, FUND A stands out as the only fund that fairly 
responded to other JSE indices, while other funds behaved like large caps funds. FUND A 
invested in both growth and value stocks as it tracked returns of both these indices. More 
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interesting, during term six, Fund A’s returns were insignificant to both value and growth 
indices. FUND B started off by sharing a significant relationship with value stocks for the 
first two terms and, thereafter, this relationship faded away. The same is true for FUND C 
whose returns were significant in the value index three times in seven terms. On the other 
hand, FUND C had a significant relationship with small cap three times in seven terms. Thus, 
it can be concluded that growth stocks share a visible relationship with the value index. In 
most cases, when growth funds were responsive to the growth index, they were also 
responsive to the value index. Whenever they negatively tracked their own index (growth), 




4.3.6 Value results and tables  
 
Turning to the value stocks style, a style that has apparently been tracked by many styles, 
interesting results were found. The sampled funds were fairly responsive to the returns of 
their own index, with FUNDS A and D being significant five and four times, respectively. 
However, the results shown in Tables 30-33 show a clear trend of style drift that took place 
during the fifth to seventh terms.  
Interesting findings were obtained when matching these results with those from the Engle-
Granger two-step procedure. This co-integration test revealed that the two indices, i.e., value 
and resources were not co-integrated in the first two years of the period under study. 
Although three funds in the study sample, i.e., FUNDS A, C and D, were not tracking the 
returns of the resources index, FUND B was statistically significant. This was a safe move for 
FUND B because there was no long-run relationship at that time. The results from Engle-
Granger show that during the second two years of this analysis, which can be equated to term 
three in the factor model, these two funds started to be co-integrated. During this period, all 
the funds shifted away from tracking the index; the results showed that most betas were 
negative and significant, and where positive betas were recorded, the p-values pronounced 
them to be statistically insignificant. 
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During the fourth second year of the Engle-Granger two-step model, the results show that 
these two indices were not co-integrated. When these results were compared to those from 
the asset class factor model, it was found that three funds in the sample started to build a 
positive relationship with the resource index. Therefore, acknowledgement of market timing 
skills and diversification hunger among fund managers is important in this instance. 
 
 
Table 30: Value FUND A; factor model results 
VALUE   Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  -1.6687 0.2741 -3.5324 0.1048 3.2563 -2.2535 -7.2575 
Large cap p value  0.0156 0.7113 0.0014 0.9271 0.0497 0.1098 0.0001 
           Beta  0.0523 0.5854 0.2092 -0.0716 0.7523 -0.0351 0.2546 
Small cap p value  0.6273 0.0002 0.1087 0.6479 0.0014 0.8733 0.3427 
          
 Beta  -0.4753 -0.3204 -0.7131 0.0900 0.2633 0.5466 0.6013 
Resources p value  0.0000 0.0265 0.0000 0.4839 0.0939 0.0000 0.0000 
          
 Beta  1.9539 0.3351 3.0614 0.2821 -1.9441 0.9192 2.3679 
VALUE P VALUE  0.0000 0.4726 0.0000 0.6681 0.0352 0.0972 0.0004 
          
 Beta  1.2754 0.0496 2.7342 0.0574 -1.7081 1.8062 5.4447 
Growth p value  0.0011 0.8877 0.0000 0.9269 0.0685 0.0839 0.0001 
          
 Beta  -0.0827 0.4152 -0.4057 0.0914 0.1950 -0.2637 -0.6664 














Table 31: Value FUND B; factor model results  
VALUE   Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  -0.9888 -1.9023 -0.7042 0.2876 -0.3575 0.1833 -1.3237 
Large cap p value  0.2239 0.0075 0.5686 0.7830 0.7728 0.8172 0.1760 
          
 Beta  0.074 0.0540 0.2834 0.2751 -0.0801 0.0953 0.169 
Small cap p value  0.5682 0.6875 0.0650 0.0581 0.6379 0.4488 0.2808 
          
 Beta  0.3436 0.3155 -0.0678 0.1541 0.2917 0.3811 0.3358 
Resources p value  0.0040 0.0189 0.5784 0.1906 0.0160 0.0000 0.0000 
          
 Beta  0.9147 1.2387 0.5415 0.0492 0.2821 -0.1429 0.5767 
VALUE P VALUE  0.0598 0.0057 0.4546 0.9344 0.6815 0.6468 0.1177 
          
 Beta  0.4187 0.9575 0.7764 -0.2193 0.1598 0.1085 1.1226 
Growth p value  0.3295 0.0047 0.2774 0.7007 0.8197 0.8533 0.1374 
          
 Beta  -0.0964 0.056 -0.0214 0.1533 0.2819 0.0648 -0.1339 
Industrials p value  0.2704 0.5979 0.8979 0.1935 0.0276 0.5020 0.3258 
 
 
Table 32:  Value FUND C; factor model results  
 
 
VALUE   Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  -0.2103 0.7633 -1.0548 2.4206 -3.2195 -0.3382 -1.9632 
Large cap p value  0.8225 0.2382 0.3813 0.0395 0.0254 0.6899 0.0983 
          
 Beta  0.4431 0.5511 0.2887 0.2671 -0.2007 0.1696 -0.013 
Small cap p value  0.0046 0.0001 0.0538 0.0944 0.3015 0.2093 0.9447 
          
 Beta  -0.3106 -0.0206 -0.4767 -0.0274 0.3293 0.2034 0.3542 
Resources p value  0.0051 0.8660 0.0002 0.8318 0.0167 0.0076 0.0002 
          
 Beta  0.4048 -0.1773 1.3752 -0.9089 2.0659 0.2865 0.9875 
VALUE P VALUE  0.4669 0.6612 0.0545 0.1728 0.0103 0.3909 0.0284 
          
 Beta  0.6979 -0.2687 1.2826 -1.1577 1.8984 0.6141 1.6971 
Growth p value  0.1811 0.3805 0.0680 0.0702 0.0202 0.3295 0.0684 
          
 Beta  0.1186 0.3138 -0.071 0.3298 0.1233 0.0734 -0.1945 





Table 33:  Value FUND D; factor model results 
VALUE   Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 














 Beta  -1.1547 -0.2157 -1.6745 -2.8275 -1.9715 -0.1719 -0.2400 
Large cap p value  0.2203 0.7586 0.0340 0.0077 0.1290 0.8122 0.7825 
          
 Beta  0.0537 0.2320 0.0052 -0.4309 -0.1269 0.1814 0.0493 
Small cap p value  0.7205 0.0948 0.9558 0.0032 0.4730 0.1174 0.7240 
          
 Beta  -0.3783 -0.3492 -0.4259 -0.2848 -0.2764 -0.2675 -0.2945 
Resources p value  0.0008 0.0113 0.0000 0.0157 0.0272 0.0001 0.0000 
          
 Beta  1.1734 0.5118 1.4504 1.9829 1.6565 0.4258 0.7737 
VALUE P VALUE  0.0379 0.2488 0.0022 0.0013 0.0233 0.1382 0.0209 
          
 Beta  0.9248 0.3967 1.3256 2.0219 1.5269 0.5715 0.5156 
Growth p value  0.0776 0.2368 0.0042 0.0006 0.0397 0.2884 0.4430 
          
 Beta  0.1528 0.2375 0.0335 0.2037 0.0552 0.1733 0.3013 
Industrials p value  0.1334 0.0320 0.7495 0.0805 0.6706 0.0529 0.0159 
 
Tables 10-33 presented the values of betas (β) and R-squared for the sample of 24 South 
African mutual funds. As stated in the section on methodology, betas are used to check the 
relationship between mutual funds and indices. Each fund was regressed with all six indices 
per term and all betas were recorded. This was done for all seven terms and all 24 mutual 
funds. This resulted in a total number of 168 regressions.  
4.3.7 R-Squared results and tables  
 
Tables 34-39 provide R-squared for linear regression models run for the style drift objective. 
Large cap funds produced quite different results from other funds; however R-squared values 
prove that the regression model was used properly and was sufficient to capture the 
relationship between dependent and explanatory variables. By definition R-squared is a broad 








Table 34:  Small caps R-squared   
Small cap Term 1     Term 2      Term 3      Term 4  Term 5     Term 6 Term 7 
FUND A 0.7717 0.6721 0.7651 0.7106 0.8116 0.8450 0.8438 
FUND B 0.7617 0.5066 0.7484 0.7851 0.7844 0.8596 0.7501 
FUND C 0.4656 0.5566 0.7648 0.5535 0.4262 0.7881 0.7126 
FUND D 0.6621 0.5000 0.6364 0.5918 0.6657 0.7597 0.6776 
 
Table 35: Large caps R-squared   
Large cap  Term 1       Term 2       Term 3        Term  4 Term 5      Term 6  Term 7 
FUND A 0.9553 0.8505 0.8968 0.9111 0.9028 0.9571 0.8902 
FUND B 0.9198 0.8505 0.8915 0.8953 0.8343 0.9373 0.8369 
FUND C 0.9621 0.9005 0.8991 0.9119 0.8586 0.9514 0.8779 
FUND D 0.9628 0.8924 0.8865 0.9089 0.9057 0.9546 0.8796 
 
Table 36: Industrials R-squared  
Industrials    Term 1     Term 2      Term 3      Term 4     Term 5     Term 6    Term 7 
FUND A  0.8445 0.7876 0.8260 0.8327 0.6657 0.7597 0.7535 
FUND B 0.8589 0.7830 0.8572 0.8358 0.7510 0.9328 0.8486 
FUND C 0.8173 0.7614 0.8204 0.8101 0.7835 0.8369 0.6877 
FUND D 0.8421 0.7599 0.8460 0.8363 0.9368 0.9307 0.8433 
 
Table 37: Resources R-squared 
Resources    Term 1     Term 2      Term 3      Term 4     Term 5     Term 6    Term 7 
FUND A  0.9150 0.8921 0.9187 0.9382 0.9036 0.9047 0.8823 
FUND B 0.8844 0.8854 0.8882 0.8922 0.8701 0.9542 0.8589 
FUND C 0.6199 0.5148 0.4645 0.4858 0.6961 0.5383 0.6568 
FUND D 0.8160 0.8621 0.8642 0.8397 0.8259 0.9339 0.8631 
 
Table 38: Growth R-squared 
Growth  Term 1     Term 2      Term 3      Term 4  Term 5     Term 6  Term 7 
FUND A 0.8853 0.8190 0.8754 0.8780 0.8859 0.9395 0.8863 
FUND B 0.8957 0.8006 0.8456 0.8605 0.6724 0.8999 0.8407 
FUND C 0.8568 0.6877 0.9058 0.9146 0.8181 0.9535 0.8840 




Table 39:  Value R-squared 
Value    Term 1     Term 2      Term 3      Term 4     Term 5     Term 6    Term 7 
FUND A 0.5535 0.6366 0.7002 0.7424 0.8943 0.8969 0.9261 
FUND B 0.7388 0.8156 0.7878 0.7507 0.6971 0.881 0.8585 
FUND C 0.7500 0.7970 0.8587 0.8547 0.8756 0.9180 0.8209 
FUND D 0.8543 0.7811 0.8101 0.8294 0.8408 0.7952 0.7520 
 
Since R-squared values are high for large caps, there are no concerns that the model used was 
ambiguous. It can thus be concluded that the model captured and reported the exact 
relationship between large cap funds and sectorial indices. Small cap R-squared values were 
also high with the exception of FUND C which consistently reported low values which are 
further evidence of low displaying or demonstrating power. This was the case for FUND C of 
resources. Industrials, growth and value R-squared values were also high. Overall, looking at 
the numbers from the R-squared tables, it can be concluded that the model used to evaluate 
the relationships between funds and indices was efficient and correctly implemented. The 
regression outputs can thus be interpreted with confidence.  
4.4 Chapter summary  
 
The three models discussed in Chapter 3 were run and the results were presented in this 
chapter. Three different tests were conducted with the first model i.e., the ADF test, being the 
foundation of Engle-Granger two-step approach. The ADF test was not mentioned as an 
independent model simply because it is compulsory when modelling price data. The ADF 
results enabled the researcher to progress to the Engle-Granger co-integration test which was, 
in turn, successfully conducted. The results of this test were tabulated in Table 8 for the 
period of eight years which was broken down into four equal cycles and one large period 
consisting of the full eight years. The second method, the asset factor model, was also 







CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Having discussed the study’s findings in the previous chapter, this chapter provides answers 
to the questions posed in Chapter 1 as well as conclusions drawn from the results and 
interpretations set out in Chapter 4.  This chapter also combines the results obtained from the 
two different methods used and ultimately compares them with the results obtained by both 
local and international scholars. By so doing, the study highlights the similar and 
contradictory findings of other scholars. Furthermore, by comparing the results, the gaps in 
the literature are revealed. Finally, recommendations are provided for further research and the 
limitations encountered during the course of the study are discussed.  
5.2 Discussions and conclusions 
 
This study critically analysed style investing from a South African perspective. Six South 
African indices and a sample of four mutual funds per index were used to search for style 
drift and long-run relationships. Of the four mutual funds for each index, the first two were 
index top achievers at the time the data was collected, and the last two were bottom 
achievers. To achieve the study’s two objectives, two different methodologies were used, i.e., 
the Engle-Granger two-step model for long-run relationship and the asset class factor model 
for style drift. Data was collected for a period of eight years, from 2006 to 2014 and both 
daily and weekly data were used. The resultant number of weekly observations amounted to 
427 and 2 019 daily observations were recorded.  
5.2.1 Relationship between indices  
 
Objective number 1: “to analyse the long-run relationship between six different South 
African indices (i.e., value, growth, small caps, large caps, industrials and resources)”. 
Tests for co-integration were conducted because stock picking and herding behaviour has 
previously been reported in the South African mutual funds/money management industry 
(Gilmour and Smit, 2002). One of the biggest problems about stock picking is that it deters 
diversification if the long-run relationship is not known. Therefore, to tackle this issue, the 
long-run relationship must be investigated and acknowledged with certainty. This study was 
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motivated by the fact that no studies have been published that shed light on stock picking 
against diversification or long-run relationships. 
Using the co-integration methodology, the results show that the long-run relationship can be 
better understood if the tests are conducted using two-year data and above. The results 
revealed that crucial co-integrating relationships were not reported by the overall model 
which covered the whole eight-year period. By breaking the data into many different terms, 
the study was successful in indicating how the indices were related prior to recession, during 
recession and post-recession. In addition, the roll-over strategy was implemented to increase 
the number of observations and to track continuous relationships between the six selected 
indices. 
The results from the segregated periods show that during the global financial crisis, nine 
indices were co-integrated since they behaved in the same way and had a long-run 
relationship. This was no surprise because all the indices used in this study are from the same 
economy and probably share the same investors. They therefore suffer the same external and 
internal shocks, with recession being one of the biggest external shocks. In this period, of 15 
possible co-integrating equations from six indices, nine were reported co-integrated while six 
remained resilient and non-co-integrated. These findings are in line with Anderson et al. 
(2009) who investigated co-integration relationships between five international markets and 
found that, of 10 possible relationships, five were co-integrated 
Soon after the recession, these indices repelled each other and reduced the number of co-
integrating equations to six and further down to two in the last two years of the period 
covered in this study. This is testimony to the susceptibility of the South African mutual fund 
industry to change within a short period of time. 
Throughout the operation, the study recorded a repeated and significant long-run relationship 
between the following three pairs, when the segregated period method was implemented. It 
was also demonstrated that the relationship between these pairs was strong for the roll-over 
methodology. 
 small caps and industrials; 
 small caps and large caps; and   
 small caps and growth.  
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This long-run relationship was further confirmed by the bivariate model which covered a 
period of eight years. The study found a significant long-run relationship between these 
indices and thus recommends maximum diversification through investing in any of the 
available non-co-integrated indices but avoidance of investing in any of the co-integrated 
indices at the same time. Investors are, therefore, advised to look at the long-run relationship 
between the indices they wish to invest in. While they may be co-integrated, there may still 
be deviations in the short-run before market forces drive the market back to equilibrium. The 
long-run relationship between these three pairs was also confirmed by the results from the 
roll-over methodology. Small caps and industrials shared a long-run relationship throughout 
the study period. Since this pair was found to share a long run relationship using both the 
segregated period and roll-over methodologies, it can therefore be concluded that these two 
pairs trend together in the long run. Notably, p-values of (small cap/large cap) and (small 
cap/growth) were rapidly reduced until they become significant at the eight-year period, 
symbolising a long-run relationship.  
 
5.2.2 Causes and the duration of style drift 
 
Objective number 2: “to investigate and analyse the presence, causes and duration of 
style drift in the sampled funds that constitute the six South African indices investigated 
in objective one”. 
The Sharpe (1992) asset class factor model was used to investigate and analyse the presence, 
causes and duration of style drift of South African unit trusts. In the most recent literature, 
Wermers (2010) puts forward possible reasons for style drift. These range from unintentional 
drift, when stock changes its characteristics over time, to intentional drift, and when investors 
are faced with pressure from peers. Breaking the data into seven terms revealed that unit 
trusts keep changing their investment strategies. In the period covered in this study, two 
apparent style drift trends and abundant stock picking behaviour were revealed. Resources 
mutual funds proved to be the most disciplined and transparent means of investment. They 
stuck to the promised mandate which is usually provided by the name of the unit trust or 
fund. The regression model used for this objective proved to be efficient since the number of 




Most mutual funds do track the indices that they are supposed to track but they also engage in 
active trading which drives them to invest in a certain index for a shorter period of time and 
soon move to invest in another. The findings of this study relate to those of Moore (2013) 
who also used the asset class factor model to quantify funds misspecification in South 
African financial markets. Moore (2013) reported that very few managers follow one 
investment style but follow another in order to frame investor returns expectations. 
Furthermore, the returns of a large portion of funds differ from the returns of purported style.  
Large cap unit trusts were found not to follow their index and other indices in this study. 
Hence, these funds either invest in other South African indices that are not covered in this 
study or they invest in different asset classes like bonds, money market or a combination of 
asset classes not covered in this study. Furthermore, the study found that mutual funds or 
fund managers were highly influenced by herding behaviour. There is insufficient evidence to 
show that managers do not attempt to control for style drift. As long as their peers (funds with 
the same investment mandate) are still investing in that index, they stay and suddenly break 
the relationship at the same time. South Africa fund managers seem to confirm Wermers’ 
(2012) findings that controlling for style drift does not necessarily result in improved 
performance and superior returns. 
Fund managers seem to deviate from drifting when there is co-integration between their own 
index and the index they drifted to. This is concrete evidence of accurate market timing on 
the part of these managers. Consequently, they are regarded as perfect market timers. This is 
in line with Gilmour and Smit (2002) study on herding in the South African unit trust 
industry. Gilmour and Smit (2002) documented that levels of herding increased from 2, 2% in 
the first 10 quarters of the period covered by their study to 2,7% in the last 10 quarters of the 
period. Despite the increase in herding during the period of study, they also show that, from 
1996 to 1997 when there was high volatility in the market, the trend of herding disappeared. 
This is testimony to how fund managers time their strategies.    
Combining the results of both the models used in this study shows that funds exercise active 
trading in the form of stock picking and style drift. Furthermore, the study found that fund 
managers have perfect market timing. When they drift, they shift to the opposite direction of 
co-integration, which is seen as safe and efficient. While this study presents results from two 
distinct methodologies, it cannot confirm that fund managers examine co-integration 
relationships before making their move. The study therefore refrains from using “look ahead 
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bias”, or assuming that managers know that particular indices would have moved closer 
together in one period compared to another. It was, therefore, surprisingly to find that unit 
trusts keep changing their investment strategies as the co-integration between indices kept 
changing. The study fell short, however, of investigating the lead-lag relationship between 
indices and mutual funds. Simply put, it did not attempt to determine if style drift and stock 
picking initiate changes in long-run relationships or whether changes in long run-
relationships cause funds to change their investment strategies. More importantly, the results 
showed a near-perfect linear relationship between value and growth stock, meeting prior 
expectations. The literature documents them as the opposite of each other with regard to 
returns; Barberis and Shleifer (2003) stated that when there is a boom growth is expected to 
experience drought and vice versa for value. However, this was not the case in this study. 
Furthermore, the study found a negative relationship between industrials and resources. In 
terms of returns, these two indices follow the concept of style and twin. Due to the fact that 
this concept is not based solely on returns dynamics, it is inappropriate to call industrials and 
resources “style and twin”; neither can it be postulated that value and growth are not style and 
twin. To be able to do this, there is a need to go the extra mile to examine changes and 
relationships in market capitalisation. This study laid a solid foundation to shed light on the 
concept of style and twin. Should market capitalisation of growth and value be positively 
related, and that of resources and industrials be negatively related, then sufficient proof to 
make a ruling on them would have been gathered. 
5.3 Recommendations  
 
This study examined style investing from the dimensions of asset allocation and 
diversification which were obtained by comparing asset allocation against co-integration 
results. As discussed in the conclusions above, the study found style drift to move in the 
opposite direction of co-integration and such drift is regarded as safe from a portfolio 
manager’s point of view. Turning to recommendations for further studies, it would be useful 
to gain deeper insight into style investing in terms of returns and consistency and unit trusts. 
Gilmour and Smit (2002) documented herding trading in the money management industry, 
and this study documented a few style drifts and drastic changes in co-integrating 
relationships. However, returns and performance consistency overtime in this industry have 
received little attention. Teo and Woo (2001) also documented perfect market timing by fund 
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managers. However, Teo and Woo (2001) indicated that the relationship between style 
consistency and fund performance remains unclear. Combining the findings on herding in 
this industry and style drift, it would be interesting to examine if higher returns are obtained 
from such conduct in the future.  
5.4 Limitations of the study  
 
Numerous limitations materialized during the course of this study. These took the form of 
data and models. These limitations are therefore disclosed since they affect how the results 
are interpreted in the drive to reach conclusions. 
This study analysed style investing for a period of eight years due to the short life span of 
mutual funds in South Africa. While the data for indices were largely available, the aim was 
to test the reaction of unit trusts to selected indices in equal or comparable time horizons. 
Therefore, the researcher opted to conduct the study for an eight-year period. Furthermore, 
two different and unrelated models, i.e., co-integration methodology and the factor model 
were used. These models have different data frequency requirements, with the factor model 
giving efficient, accurate and optimal results when weekly data were used and taking 61 
observations per regression. This was provided by Sharpe (1992) in the paper titled “Asset 
allocation: management style and performance measurement”. Sharpe popularised the factor 
model. 
On the other hand, the Engle-Granger two-step procedure required daily data to be used when 
dealing with financial data, more especially when modelling returns co-integration. Sjö 
(2008) confirmed that in order to obtain relevant results from bivariate co-integration 
methodology, daily data must be used and the observations must amount to more than 400.  
This study aimed to evaluate style drift and the long-run relationship over time rather than at 
a single point in time. In order to do so, the data needed to be divided into different terms. It 
was difficult to keep abandoning past observations because of the observation requirement. 
Weekly data was, therefore, collected for the asset class factor model and daily data for the 
Engle-Granger two-step procedure. This led to accurate results in both models but it also 
rendered the results very difficult to match on a one-on-one basis. Although they can be 
equated, the study still found that some terms in the asset class factor model had observations 
that stretched to two different terms in the co-integration results. 
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The biggest limitation is that this study implemented two different, un-related concepts i.e., 
style drift and co-integration. As this is a unique study, its results are not directly comparable 
to any findings that can be found in the existing literature. 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
 
Gilmour and Smit (2002) found that the South African money management industry is 
characterized by herding and stock picking. This study examined the relationship between six 
selected South African indices in relation to the tracking ability of the funds which constitute 
these indices in order to determine if the concept of diversification was executed. Two 
methodologies were used: the (Engle and Granger (1987)) two-step procedure and the Sharpe 
(1992) asset class factor model. The study covered a period of eight years, with both daily 
and weekly data collected and used. 
Bearing in mind the limitations disclosed in the previous section, the study documents the 
following results:  
 South African indices are susceptible to drastic changes in a short period of time, i.e., 
as little as two years. Relationships between these indices keep changing over time. 
The study found that as time goes on, relationships between indices are established, 
abandoned and possibly resurrected over a period of eight years. 
 
 among the six local indices investigated, the study found two instances of apparent 
style drift (industrials to resources and value stocks to resources) and abundant stock 
picking behaviour. However, stock picking was in the opposite direction to co-
integration, which suggests a maximised level of diversification and perfect market 
timing by fund managers. Furthermore, fund managers do not seem to be controlling 
style drift. All funds show similar trends compared to their peers in the market which 
may possibly illustrate herding behaviour, which is behaviour that mimics peers’ 
movements. 
 
 from a South African perspective, value and growth funds did not show that they are 
style and twins. The literature pronounces them the opposite of each other. However, 
in South Africa, they appear to perfectly complement each other. Only industrials and 
resources showed the characteristics of being fund and twin. The evidence for this 
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proposition can be extracted from both the short-run and long-run relationship results. 
Small caps and industrials proved to have a strong long-run relationship, followed by 
(small cap/growth) and (small cap/ value). In the short run, the resources index moved 
in the opposite direction from all the other five indices. 
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7. APPENDICES  
 
7.1 Appendix A: List and full names of unit trusts used  
 
LARGE CAP 
1. Stanlib alsi 40 fund class A  (LBFT)     FUND A 
2. Absa large cap fund    (ABRF)      FUND B 
3. Oldmutual top 40 fund A    (OMSA)    FUND C 
4. Momentum top 40 index fund (RMBT)    FUND D 
SMALLCAP  
1. Nedgroup investment entrepreneur fund R (NDBE)   FUND A  
2. Oldmutual small companies Fund R (OMSC)    FUND B 
3. Stanlib small cap fund class A (GDSC)        FUND C 
4. Coronation smaller companies fund (COSG)      FUND D 
 
RESOURCES  
1. Investec commodity fund class R (INVC)     FUND A  
2. Nedgroup investment mining and resources fund class R (SYMR)    FUND B 
3. Stanlib gold and precious metal fund class R (STDG)       FUND C  
4. Oldmutual mining and resources Fund R (OMTM)     FUND D  
 
VALUE  
1. Investec value fund class R (INVF)       FUND A  
2. Element Islamic equity fund A (FIEU)     FUND B 
3. Cadiz mastermind fund class A (AHMF)        FUND C  
4. Marriott dividend growth fund class R (HLMK)     FUND D 
 
GROWTH  
1. Foord equity fund (FEQF)    FUND A  
2. Sim top choice equity fund A (STCA1)    FUND B  
3. Investec growth fund class A (FGGA)     FUND C 







1. Coronation industrials fund class A (CNCG)    FUND A  
2. Stanlib industrial fund class A (LIIA)     FUND B  
3. Momentum industrial fund A (RMCF)     FUND C  
4. Stanlib industrial fund class R (GDKI)    FUND D 
 
 
7.2 Appendix B: ADF and PP/unit root E-views output 
 
Table 40: Large cap level 
 
Null Hypothesis: LARGECAP has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=25)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
      
      Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.779610  0.7145  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595   
 5% level  -3.412036   
 10% level  -3.127928   
      
      
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
Null Hypothesis: LARGECAP has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Bandwidth: 12 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel  
      
         Adj. t-Stat   Prob.*  
      
      Phillips-Perron test statistic -1.535720  0.8172  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595   
 5% level  -3.412036   
 10% level  -3.127928   
      





















Table 41: Large cap 1st difference 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LARGECAP) has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=25)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
      
      Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -44.67914  0.0000  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962598   
 5% level  -3.412037   
 10% level  -3.127929   
      
      
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LARGECAP) has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Bandwidth: 14 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel  
      
         Adj. t-Stat   Prob.*  
      
      Phillips-Perron test statistic -45.10064  0.0000  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962598   
 5% level  -3.412037   
 10% level  -3.127929   
      
      
 
Table 42: Small cap level 
 
Null Hypothesis: SMALLCAP has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=25)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
      
      Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -0.167062  0.9937  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962598   
 5% level  -3.412037   
 10% level  -3.127929   
      
      
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
Null Hypothesis: SMALLCAP has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Bandwidth: 21 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel  
      
         Adj. t-Stat   Prob.*  
      
      Phillips-Perron test statistic -0.559479  0.9807  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595   
 5% level  -3.412036   
 10% level  -3.127928   
      






Table 43: Small cap 1st difference  
 
Null Hypothesis: D(SMALLCAP) has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=25)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
      
      Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -37.79995  0.0000  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962598   
 5% level  -3.412037   
 10% level  -3.127929   
      
      
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
Null Hypothesis: D(SMALLCAP) has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Bandwidth: 20 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel  
      
         Adj. t-Stat   Prob.*  
      
      Phillips-Perron test statistic -40.50853  0.0000  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962598   
 5% level  -3.412037   
 10% level  -3.127929   
      
      
 
 
Table 44: Resources level 
 
Null Hypothesis: RESOURCES has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=25)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
      
      Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.921993  0.1556  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595   
 5% level  -3.412036   
 10% level  -3.127928   
      
      
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
Null Hypothesis: RESOURCES has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Bandwidth: 4 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel  
      
         Adj. t-Stat   Prob.*  
      
      Phillips-Perron test statistic -2.910197  0.1593  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595   
 5% level  -3.412036   
 10% level  -3.127928   
      





Table 45: Resources 1st difference  
 
Null Hypothesis: D(RESOURCES) has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=25)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
      
      Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -42.70591  0.0000  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962598   
 5% level  -3.412037   
 10% level  -3.127929   
      
      
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
Null Hypothesis: D(RESOURCES) has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Bandwidth: 8 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel  
      
         Adj. t-Stat   Prob.*  
      
      Phillips-Perron test statistic -42.69522  0.0000  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962598   
 5% level  -3.412037   
 10% level  -3.127929   
      
      
 
 
Table 46: Value level  
 
Null Hypothesis: VALUE has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=25)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
      
      Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.944985  0.6302  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595   
 5% level  -3.412036   
 10% level  -3.127928   
      
      
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
Null Hypothesis: VALUE has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Bandwidth: 14 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel  
      
         Adj. t-Stat   Prob.*  
      
      Phillips-Perron test statistic -1.730970  0.7373  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595   
 5% level  -3.412036   
 10% level  -3.127928   
      





Table 47: Value 1st difference  
 
Null Hypothesis: D(VALUE) has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=25)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
      
      Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -44.39618  0.0000  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962598   
 5% level  -3.412037   
 10% level  -3.127929   
      
      
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
Null Hypothesis: D(VALUE) has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Bandwidth: 16 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel  
      
         Adj. t-Stat   Prob.*  
      
      Phillips-Perron test statistic -44.68407  0.0000  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962598   
 5% level  -3.412037   
 10% level  -3.127929   
      
      
 
 
Table 48: Growth level 
 
Null Hypothesis: GROWTH has a unit root    
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend    
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=25)   
       
          t-Statistic   Prob.*   
       
       Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.639408  0.7772   
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595    
 5% level  -3.412036    
 10% level  -3.127928    
       
       
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.    
 
Null Hypothesis: GROWTH has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Bandwidth: 9 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel  
      
         Adj. t-Stat   Prob.*  
      
      Phillips-Perron test statistic -1.489805  0.8331  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595   
 5% level  -3.412036   
 10% level  -3.127928   
      






Table 49: Growth 1st difference  
 
Null Hypothesis: D(GROWTH) has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=25)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
      
      Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -43.91207  0.0000  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962598   
 5% level  -3.412037   
 10% level  -3.127929   
      
      
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
Null Hypothesis: D(GROWTH) has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Bandwidth: 11 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel  
      
         Adj. t-Stat   Prob.*  
      
      Phillips-Perron test statistic -44.08526  0.0000  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962598   
 5% level  -3.412037   
 10% level  -3.127929   
      
      
 
 Table 50: Industrials level  
 
Null Hypothesis: INDUSTRIALS has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=25)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
      
      Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.346759  0.8757  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595   
 5% level  -3.412036   
 10% level  -3.127928   
      
      
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
Null Hypothesis: INDUSTRIALS has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Bandwidth: 3 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel  
      
         Adj. t-Stat   Prob.*  
      
      Phillips-Perron test statistic -1.341000  0.8772  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595   
 5% level  -3.412036   
 10% level  -3.127928   
      





 Table 51: Industrials 1st difference  
 
Null Hypothesis: D(INDUSTRIALS) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=2 5)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
      
      Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -44.39402  0.0000  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962598   
 5% level  -3.412037   
 10% level  -3.127929   
      
      
 
Null Hypothesis: D(INDUSTRIALS) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Bandwidth: 1 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel  
      
         Adj. t-Stat   Prob.*  
      
      Phillips-Perron test statistic -44.39424  0.0000  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962598   
 5% level  -3.412037   
 10% level  -3.127929   
      
      
 
 
7.3 Appendix C: Engle-Granger results 
7.3.1 Engle-Granger results, Panel A 
 
Table 52: ADF results for Panel A 
ADF test on small cap and industrials residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USI has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.727964  0.0214 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     







ADF test on small cap and resources residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 2 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.621707  0.7833 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976629  
 5% level  -3.418889  
 10% level  -3.131986  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
ADF test on small cap and large cap residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USL has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.481770  0.8348 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     






   
 
ADF test on small cap and growth residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.527008  0.8193 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     






ADF test on small cap and value residuals  
 
Null Hypothesis: USV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.058448  0.5672 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     





ADF test on industrials and resources residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: UIR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.144957  0.5189 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
ADF test on industrials and large cap residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: UIL has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.952719  0.6250 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     






ADF test on industrials and growth 
 
Null Hypothesis: UIG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.100575  0.5437 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     




ADF test on industrials and value residuals  
 
Null Hypothesis: UIV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.735128  0.7343 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     




ADF test on resources and large cap residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: URL has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.715092  0.2309 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     






ADF test on resources and growth residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: URG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.545919  0.3058 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
ADF test on resources and value residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: URV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.322190  0.4206 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976591  
 5% level  -3.418870  
 10% level  -3.131976  
     
     




ADF test on large cap and growth residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: ULG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.142956  0.0976 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     






ADF test on large cap and value residuals  
 
Null Hypothesis: ULV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.003637  0.5974 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
ADF test on growth and value residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: UGV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.732688  0.2238 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976591  
 5% level  -3.418870  
 10% level  -3.131976  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
7.3.2 Engle-Granger results, Panel B 
 
Table 53: ADF results for Panel B 
ADF test on small cap and industrials residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USI has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.697238  0.0008 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     




ADF test on small cap and resources residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.861058  0.0143 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
ADF test on small cap and large cap residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USL has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.543084  0.0014 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     




ADF test on small cap and growth residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.135615  0.0001 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     







ADF test on small cap and value residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.164338  0.0929 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     





ADF test on industrials and resources residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: UIR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.835891  0.1850 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
ADF test on industrials and large cap residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: UIL has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.927608  0.1546 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     






ADF test on industrials and growth 
 
Null Hypothesis: UIG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.451743  0.0459 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     




ADF test on industrials and value residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: UIV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.780472  0.2052 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     




ADF test on resources and large cap residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: URL has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.492455  0.0412 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     






ADF test on resources and growth residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: URG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.456172  0.3500 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     




ADF test on resources and value residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: URV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.050183  0.0079 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
ADF test on large cap and growth residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: ULG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.325811  0.0633 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     






ADF test on large cap and value residuals  
 
Null Hypothesis: ULV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.278468  0.0036 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     




ADF test on growth and value residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: UGV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.021154  0.0087 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976554  
 5% level  -3.418852  
 10% level  -3.131965  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
7.3.3 Engle Granger results, Panel C 
 
Table 54: ADF results for Panel C 
ADF test on small cap and industrials residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USI has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.772793  0.0006 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976480  
 5% level  -3.418816  
 10% level  -3.131943  
     
     




ADF test on small cap and resources residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.227479  0.4727 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976480  
 5% level  -3.418816  
 10% level  -3.131943  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
ADF test on small cap and large cap residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USL has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.887617  0.0132 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976480  
 5% level  -3.418816  
 10% level  -3.131943  
     
     




ADF test on small cap and growth residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.200197  0.0048 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976480  
 5% level  -3.418816  
 10% level  -3.131943  
     
     







ADF test on small cap and value residuals  
 
Null Hypothesis: USV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.476979  0.0430 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976480  
 5% level  -3.418816  
 10% level  -3.131943  
     
     




ADF test on industrials and resources residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: UIR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.332461  0.4150 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976480  
 5% level  -3.418816  
 10% level  -3.131943  
     
     




ADF test on industrials and large cap residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: UIL has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.505020  0.3256 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976480  
 5% level  -3.418816  
 10% level  -3.131943  
     
     






ADF test on industrials and growth 
 
Null Hypothesis: UIG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.839028  0.1839 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976480  
 5% level  -3.418816  
 10% level  -3.131943  
     
     




ADF test on industrials and value residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: UIV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.017205  0.5900 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976480  
 5% level  -3.418816  
 10% level  -3.131943  
     
     




ADF test on resources and large cap residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: URL has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.334091  0.0620 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976480  
 5% level  -3.418816  
 10% level  -3.131943  
     
     






ADF test on resources and growth residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: URG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.402582  0.0521 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976480  
 5% level  -3.418816  
 10% level  -3.131943  
     
     




ADF test on resources and value residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: URV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.450951  0.0460 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976480  
 5% level  -3.418816  
 10% level  -3.131943  
     
     




ADF test on large cap and growth residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: ULG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.396287  0.3810 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976517  
 5% level  -3.418834  
 10% level  -3.131954  
     
     






ADF test on large cap and value residuals  
 
Null Hypothesis: ULV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.728745  0.2254 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976480  
 5% level  -3.418816  
 10% level  -3.131943  
     
     




ADF test on growth and value residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: UGV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.746918  0.7288 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.976480  
 5% level  -3.418816  
 10% level  -3.131943  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
7.3.4 Engle Granger results, Panel D 
 
Table 55: ADF results for Panel D 
ADF test on small cap and industrials residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USI has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.894799  0.1650 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.975976  
 5% level  -3.418570  
 10% level  -3.131798  
     
     




ADF test on small cap and resources residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.859329  0.6740 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.975941  
 5% level  -3.418553  
 10% level  -3.131788  
     
     




ADF test on small cap and large cap residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USL has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.020203  0.1276 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.975941  
 5% level  -3.418553  
 10% level  -3.131788  
     
     




ADF test on small cap and growth residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.135948  0.0991 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.975941  
 5% level  -3.418553  
 10% level  -3.131788  
     
     






ADF test on small cap and value residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.107881  0.1055 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.975941  
 5% level  -3.418553  
 10% level  -3.131788  
     
     




ADF test on industrials and resources residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: UIR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.846307  0.6807 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.975941  
 5% level  -3.418553  
 10% level  -3.131788  
     
     




ADF test on industrials and large cap residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: UIL has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.004244  0.5971 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.975941  
 5% level  -3.418553  
 10% level  -3.131788  
     
     






ADF test on industrials and growth 
 
Null Hypothesis: UIG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.138263  0.5227 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.975941  
 5% level  -3.418553  
 10% level  -3.131788  
     
     





ADF test on industrials and value residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: UIV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.861994  0.6727 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.975941  
 5% level  -3.418553  
 10% level  -3.131788  
     
     




ADF test on resources and large cap residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: URL has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.731836  0.7358 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.975941  
 5% level  -3.418553  
 10% level  -3.131788  
     
     






ADF test on resources and growth residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: URG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.709079  0.7461 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.975941  
 5% level  -3.418553  
 10% level  -3.131788  
     
     




ADF test on resources and value residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: URV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.858590  0.6744 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.975941  
 5% level  -3.418553  
 10% level  -3.131788  
     
     




ADF test on large cap and growth residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: ULG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.359365  0.0027 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.975941  
 5% level  -3.418553  
 10% level  -3.131788  
     
     




ADF test on large cap and value residuals  
 
Null Hypothesis: ULV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.179201  0.0898 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.975941  
 5% level  -3.418553  
 10% level  -3.131788  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
ADF test on growth and value residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: UGV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.536264  0.0366 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.975941  
 5% level  -3.418553  
 10% level  -3.131788  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
7.3.5 Engle-Granger results, Panel E 
 
Table 56: ADF results for Panel E 
ADF test on small cap and industrials residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USI has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.433398  0.0019 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962598  
 5% level  -3.412037  
 10% level  -3.127929  
     
     





ADF test on small cap and resources residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.118996  0.9243 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595  
 5% level  -3.412036  
 10% level  -3.127928  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
ADF test on small cap and large cap residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USL has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.008869  0.0086 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595  
 5% level  -3.412036  
 10% level  -3.127928  
     
     




ADF test on small cap and growth residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.021329  0.0083 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595  
 5% level  -3.412036  
 10% level  -3.127928  
     
     







ADF test on small cap and value residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: USV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 4 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.966263  0.6188 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962605  
 5% level  -3.412041  
 10% level  -3.127931  
     
     





ADF test on industrials and resources residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: UIR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.562889  0.8073 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962598  
 5% level  -3.412037  
 10% level  -3.127929  
     
     




ADF test on industrials and large cap residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: UIL has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.011138  0.1293 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595  
 5% level  -3.412036  
 10% level  -3.127928  
     
     




ADF test on industrials and growth 
 
Null Hypothesis: UIG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.287405  0.0686 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595  
 5% level  -3.412036  
 10% level  -3.127928  
     
     




ADF test on industrials and value residuals  
 
Null Hypothesis: UIV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.182147  0.4988 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595  
 5% level  -3.412036  
 10% level  -3.127928  
     
     




ADF test on resources and large cap residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: URL has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.196424  0.0854 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962598  
 5% level  -3.412037  
 10% level  -3.127929  
     
     






ADF test on resources and growth residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: URG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.918442  0.1567 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595  
 5% level  -3.412036  
 10% level  -3.127928  
     
     




ADF test on resources and value residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: URV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.219075  0.0809 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962598  
 5% level  -3.412037  
 10% level  -3.127929  
     
     




ADF test on large cap and growth residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: ULG has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.115619  0.1028 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595  
 5% level  -3.412036  
 10% level  -3.127928  
     
     






ADF test on large cap and value residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: ULV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.875956  0.6666 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595  
 5% level  -3.412036  
 10% level  -3.127928  
     
     




ADF test on growth and value residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: UGV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.054077  0.5706 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962595  
 5% level  -3.412036  
 10% level  -3.127928  
     
     













7.4 Appendix D: Correlation matrix results 
7.4.1 Segregated periods method results   
 
 
FIRST 2 YEARS 
 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary      
Sample: 9/08/2006 9/05/2008      
Included observations: 499      
        
        Correlation       
Probability GROWTHr  INDUSTRIALSr  LARGECAPr  RESOURCEr  SMALLCAPr  VALUEr  
GROWTHr  1.000000       
 -----        
        
INDUSTRIALSr  0.605300 1.000000      
 0.0000 -----       
        
LARGECAPr  0.957818 0.699495 1.000000     
 0.0000 0.0000 -----      
        
RESOURCESr  0.929903 0.478557 0.924536 1.000000    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----     
        
SMALLCAPr  0.539272 0.594639 0.568271 0.469743 1.000000   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----    
        
VALUEr  0.839135 0.770652 0.954626 0.830308 0.619440 1.000000 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----  
        
        
 
SECOND 2 YEARS  
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary      
Sample: 9/08/2008 9/07/2010      
Included observations: 499      
        
        Correlation       
Probability GROWTHr  INDUSTRIALSr  LARGECAPr  RESOURCEr  SMALLCAPr  VALUEr  
GROWTHr  1.000000       
 -----        
        
INDUSTRIALSr  0.758215 1.000000      
 0.0000 -----       
        
LARGECAPr  0.982552 0.793599 1.000000     
 0.0000 0.0000 -----      
        
RESOURCESr  0.957678 0.687261 0.955291 1.000000    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----     
        
SMALLCAPr  0.586736 0.588254 0.601360 0.561315 1.000000   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----    
        
VALUEr  0.903288 0.9832818 0.964763 0.888286 0.634828 1.000000 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----  
        





THIRD 2 YEARS 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary      
Sample: 9/08/2010 9/07/2012      
Included observations: 501      
        
        Correlation       
Probability GROWTHr  INDUSTRIALSr  LARGECAPr  RESOURCEr  SMALLCAPr  VALUEr  
GROWTHr  1.000000       
 -----        
        
INDUSTRIALSr  0.742303 1.000000      
 0.0000 -----       
        
LARGECAPr  0.980566 0.771095 1.000000     
 0.0000 0.0000 -----      
        
RESOURCESr  0.920049 0.629944 0.932149 1.000000    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0858 -----     
        
SMALLCAPr  0.489969 0.518589 0.486889 0.472932 1.000000   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----    
        
VALUEr  0.917268 0.811207 0.970764 0.889796 0.519475 1.000000 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0473 0.0000 -----  
        
        
 
 
FOURTH 2 YEARS   
 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary      
Sample: 9/10/2012 10/06/2014      
Included observations: 516      
        
        Correlation       
Probability GROWTHr  INDUSTRIALSr  LARGECAPr  RESOURCEr  SMALLCAPr  VALUEr  
GROWTHr  1.000000       
 -----        
        
INDUSTRIALSr  0.633170 1.000000      
 0.0000 -----       
        
LARGECAPr  0.985294 0.685949 1.000000     
 0.0000 0.0000 -----      
        
RESOURCESr  0.814212 0.401200 0.818651 1.000000    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----     
        
SMALLCAPr  0.542397 0.535218 0.537093 0.375211 1.000000   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----    
        
VALUEr  0.792125 0.820393 0.872458 0.642137 0.556536 1.000000 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----  
        
        








8 YEAR PERIOD (Overall period)  
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary      
Sample: 9/08/2006 10/06/2014      
Included observations: 2018      
        
        
Correlation       
Probability GROWTHr  INDUSTRIALSr  LARGECAPr  RESOURCEr SMALLCAPr  VALUEr  
GROWTHr  1.000000       
 -----        
        
INDUSTRIALSr  0.693328 1.000000      
 0.0000 -----       
        
LARGECAPr  0.975410 0.747139 1.000000     
 0.0000 0.0000 -----      
        
RESOURCESr  0.930138 0.582425 0.929647 1.000000    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----     
        
SMALLCAPr  0.550452 0.571620 0.563562 0.496803 1.000000   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----    
        
VALUEr 0.877001 0.807095 0.953911 0.847562 0.600647 1.000000 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----  
        















7.4.2 Roll-over method results  
 
FIRST CYCLE 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary      
Sample: 9/08/2006 9/05/2008      
Included observations: 500      
        
        Correlation       
Probability GROWTHr  INDUSTRIALSr  LARGECAPr  RESOURCEr  SMALLCAPr  VALUEr  
GROWTHr  1.000000       
 -----        
        
INDUSTRIALSr  0.605300 1.000000      
 0.0000 -----       
        
LARGECAPr  0.957818 0.699495 1.000000     
 0.0000 0.0000 -----      
        
RESOURCESr  0.929903 0.478557 0.924536 1.000000    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----     
        
SMALLCAPr  0.539272 0.594639 0.568271 0.469743 1.000000   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----    
        
VALUEr  0.839135 0.770652 0.954626 0.830308 0.619440 1.000000 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----  
        
        
 
SECOND CYCLE 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary      
Sample: 9/08/2006 9/07/2010      
Included observations: 1000      
        
        Correlation       
Probability GROWTHr  INDUSTRIALSr  LARGECAPr  RESOURCEr  SMALLCAPr  VALUEr  
GROWTHr  1.000000       
 -----        
        
INDUSTRIALSr  0.699346 1.000000      
 0.0000 -----       
        
LARGECAPr  0.973831 0.756855 1.000000     
 0.0000 0.0000 -----      
        
RESOURCESr  0.947388 0.608498 0.944796 1.000000    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----     
        
SMALLCAPr 0.565146 0.590114 0.584553 0.523167 1.000000   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----    
        
VALUEr  0.880893 0.807878 0.961253 0.774793 0.625503 1.000000 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----  
        






Covariance Analysis: Ordinary      
Sample: 9/08/2006 9/07/2012      
Included observations: 1502      
        
        Correlation       
Probability GROWTHr  INDUSTRIALSr  LARGECAPr  RESOURCEr  SMALLCAPr  VALUEr  
GROWTHr 1.000000       
 -----        
        
INDUSTRIALSr  0.704898 1.000000      
 0.0000 -----       
        
LARGECAPr  0.974531 0.758567 1.000000     
 0.0000 0.0000 -----      
        
RESOURCESr  0.943397 0.610416 0.942400 1.000000    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----     
        
SMALLCAPr  0.553551 0.577881 0.568652 0.515134 1.000000   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----    
        
VALUEr  0.886124 0.807973 0.962788 0.871228 0.608202 1.000000 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----  
        
        
 
OVERALL PERIOD  
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary      
Sample: 9/08/2006 10/06/2014      
Included observations: 2019      
        
        
Correlation       
Probability GROWTHr  INDUSTRIALSr  LARGECAPr  RESOURCEr SMALLCAPr  VALUEr  
GROWTHr  1.000000       
 -----        
INDUSTRIALSr  0.693328 1.000000      
 0.0000 -----       
        
LARGECAPr  0.975410 0.747139 1.000000     
 0.0000 0.0000 -----      
        
RESOURCESr  0.930138 0.582425 0.929647 1.000000    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----     
        
SMALLCAPr  0.550452 0.571620 0.563562 0.496803 1.000000   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----    
        
VALUEr  0.877001 0.807095 0.953911 0.847562 0.600647 1.000000 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----  
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